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PREFACE 
The present work represents an attempt to understand 
the complex cognitive processes which underlie the general 
class of human behaviors known as creative problem solving. 
More specifically, I will use inventiveness to represent the 
broader class of creative human behaviors. Therefore, my 
major aim will be to examine human inventiveness, and any 
implications for the more general class of creativity will 
be limited by the degree with which human inventiveness 
accurately represents the breadth of human creative problem 
solving. 
Two separate avenues of scientific inquiry were pursued 
during the course of the project. The first approach was an 
attempt to study human inventiveness in the laboratory. 
This investigative strategy attempted to extend classic 
research findings from traditional problem solving domains 
(e.g chess, game-playing) to the less constrained creative 
problem solving domain of invention. The technique used was 
a modification of the approach used by Chase and Simon 
(1973) to study Chess expertise. The first invest1gative 
strategy was also highly influenced by the techniques 
traditionally used in expert system development, knowledge 
engineering, and rule-oriented information processing 
analyses. 
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The second investigative tactic was to examine creative 
human problem solving at a more theoretical level in order 
to achieve three primary aims. First, I wished to provide 
an overview of what is now often referred to as the 
traditional symbolic approach to studying human problem 
solving which was advanced by Newell and Simon (1972). 
Next, I wished to examine a more recently developed approach 
to understanding human cognition known as neural or 
connectionist modeling. In doing so, I hoped to develop 
insights into human creativity and inventiveness that might 
be provided by this newer perspective on cognition. Lastly, 
I attempted to identify, describe, and integrate the 
advantages of both the traditional symbolic and 
connectionist perspectives, so that a more unified, and 
complete, view of human inventiveness and creativity might 
emerge. 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to the faculty 
and students of the 0. S. U. Psychology department for the 
support and inspiration I have received throughout my 
graduate program. Special thanks goes to Dr. Larry 
Hochhaus, Dr. Robert Stanners, Dr. Donald Fromme, and Dr. 
James Price for their advice, tutelage, and friendship which 
made the rigors of graduate study worthwhile and enjoyable. 
Likewise, I wish to express gratitude to Dr. Robert Weber 
for his mentorship, friendship, and encouraging me to follow 
my interests and instincts during the dissertation project. 
I also wish to thank the dissertation committee (Dr. Robert 
iv 
Weber, Dr. Robert Stanners, Dr. Larry Hochhaus, and Dr. 
Charles Bacon) for their assistance, comments and support 
throughout the project. Many thanks go to my wife Katrena, 
my parents, my family, and my friends for bolstering my 
spirits during the seemingly endless effort to complete this 
project. Lastly, I would like to thank Jacob McCollum for 
continually putting my priorities in perspective. 
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Abstract 
Experimentation and a integrated perspective of current 
theories were used to investigate human inventiveness. 
During the experiment, two expert inventors and two 
novices replicated a mechanical object and a nonsense 
object. In accordance with Chase and simon (1973), 
experts were expected to outperform novices in the 
mechanical condition and perform equivalently to 
novices in the nonsense condition. No statistical 
difference, however, was found betwe~n experts and 
novices. Interpretation is complicated by a possible 
ceiling effect and the confounding of expertise with 
subject age due to difficulties obtaining expert 
inventors as subjects. An extended discussion section 
examines conventional models of problem solving, the 
fundamentals of parallel distributed processing models, 
and how the two might be integrated to produce a new 
perspective on inventiveness. Edison's invention of 
the electric light is examined from an integrated 
perspective to illustrate the insights that might be 
gained from unifying conventional and neural processing 
models. 
Cognitive Dimensions of Human Problem Solving, 
Invention, and Creativity from Conventional, 
Connectionist, and Integrated 
Perspectives 
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Areas of expertise which are generally described 
as creative (e.g. musical composition, creative 
writing, invention, sculpture, painting) are 
intrinsically interesting and important because 
creative activity best exemplifies the human cognitive 
abilities which distinguish us from even our nearest 
cousins in the animal kingdom. Indeed, humanity's 
propensity for inventive and creative actions is 
largely responsible for our success as a species. 
Studying creativity may therefore provide insight into 
the human mind's unique capacities and facilitate the 
development of techniques which can improve human 
problem solving performance. Unfortunately, due to 
their unconstrained, intense, and often lengthy nature, 
creative behaviors are some of the most difficult to 
systematically study. 
Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1962) described four 
characteristics which distinguish creative problem 
solving from other forms of problem solving behavior. 
According to their view, creative problem solving is 
problem solving which produces a novel end-product by 
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using unconventional strategies, persistent, highly 
intense thought, and a loosely constrained problem 
formulation. In this view, the product of a creative 
act must be unique, or novel, and have value to the 
solver or others. The thinking must also be 
unconventional in that it requires modification or 
rejection of traditional approaches to similar 
problems. Creative problem solving further requires 
persistence and high motivation over a long period of 
time, and periods of intense concentration are 
necessary to arrive at a successful end product. This 
may be due to the fact that traditional approaches are 
wrong for the solution of a problem and the solver must 
work through those incorrect solutions in order to 
"create" a correct solution. Lastly, a creative 
problem must in large part be defined by the solver. 
That is, the problem is poorly defined and the 
constraints upon the problem are loose, at best. Thus, 
a large part of creative problem solving is discovering 
and formulating the specific problem, and sub-problems, 
to be solved. 
The trad1tional approach to studying problem 
solving has often been directed at examining the 
behaviors of experts performing in relatively well 
defined problem domains (e.g. chess playing, computer 
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programming, medical diagnosis, complex arithmetic 
calculations). A chess match or the writing of a 
computer program can be observed from start to finish 
in a few hours. on the other hand, a more creative 
activity, such as invention, may take weeks, months, or 
years to complete. One may also easily determine 
whether a computer program or a chess strategy was 
successful. An invention or a novel is not so easily 
judged as successful or unsuccessful and may well 
depend upon its placement in time and space (eg., works 
that are largely ignored until years, decades, or 
centuries after their creation; conversely, the 
creation of an incandescent light bulb would be seen as 
creative in the 1800's but rather conventional in the 
1990's). It is therefore, relatively simple to observe 
and manipulate initial states, intermediate states, and 
objectively-defined end states in problem solving 
domains such as chess playing or computer programming. 
Furthermore, the goals in traditional problem solving 
domains are usually well defined, and the solutions 
often result from recombinations of standard approaches 
(e.g. using the same I/O routines or similar algorithms 
in different programs, using the same opening or middle 
game strategies in different chess matches, etc.). 
Additionally, the constraints involved in a chess match 
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or the writing of a computer program are clearly 
defined {e.g. a king can move one square in any 
direction, each PASCAL statement must end with a 
semicolon, etc.). A substantial portion of the 
processes which allow for the successful solution to 
problems in these areas can therefore, be classified as 
conventional problem solving skills. 
The d1stinction between conventional and creative 
problem solving does not imply that one class of 
activity is completely devoid of creativity and that 
the other is a wholly creative enterprise. Generally 
speaking, when one begins to write a computer program, 
the programmer has a fairly clear idea of the function 
that the program is to perform, the computer language 
in which it will be written, many of the operational 
constraints (e.g. syntax, memory capacity, value 
ranges, limiting cases), the user audience, and may 
even know which previously written blocks of code will 
be reused in the new program. When an author begins a 
new work however, she may have only a few ideas about 
the characters, the actions they will take, the 
ultimate outcome, the purpose of the work, or who will 
read the text. Classifying a given problem solving 
activity as creative or convent1onal is determined by 
the degree of creative act1vity required to develop a 
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satisfactory result, and not the domain in which the 
problem solving is performed. From this perspective, 
computer programming is a problem solving domain that 
requires relatively fewer creative behaviors than 
invention or novel writing, but any specific problem 
solving activity within the programming domain cannot 
be judged as conventional, or creative, based solely 
upon the domain in which it occurs. The distinction 
between creative and conventional problem solving 
domains is the number and centrality of problems within 
a domain which require a novel solution by means of a 
difficult, poorly constrained, unconventional problem 
formation. The judgement of creative or conventional 
is therefore a relative distinction. That is, domains 
such as medical diagnoses and computer programming may 
be judged as conventional when compared to invention, 
but programming is certainly a creative domain when 
compared to solving two digit multiplication problems. 
Areas of expertise in which creativity plays a 
large, central role are difficult to study in a 
controlled laboratory environment because creative 
problem solving involves poorly defined starting 
states, subjectively-defined end products, poor, or 
loose, constraints on the variety of useable 
techniques, and may take place over long time spans. 
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Traditional approaches to the study of expertise, 
sometimes known as knowledge engineering, have involved 
four general steps (Hayes-Roth, Waterman, & Lenat; 
1983). (a) Interview and re-interview experts. (b) 
Observe experts performing skills of interest, and 
obtain protocols based upon observations and 
interviews. (c) Propose possible processes, 
characteristics, knowledge structures, and heuristics 
which would account for the superior performance of 
experts. (d) Build a system based upon those 
constructs, and verify that the system operates 
effectively in the domain of interest. 
Some researchers have questioned the reliability 
of findings based on interviews with experts (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Several other researchers, however, 
have indicated that verbal protocols can be quite 
reliable if subjects are asked to describe their 
actions and not explain or make inferences about their 
actions (Ericsson & Simon 1984, 1980; Kellog, 1982; 
Kellog & Holley, 1983). Furthermore, the utility of 
the knowledge engineering approach has also been 
successfully demonstrated several times by the creation 
of effective expert systems (e.g. Dendra!, Mycin, 
Prospector, to name just a few). 
Even with the issue of verbal report reliability 
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aside, creative activities, such as invention, take 
place over a long span of time and it is therefore 
difficult to develop meaningful, complete descriptions 
of invention which are based solely upon the verbal 
reports of experts. In addition, interview methodology 
is a labor intensive, tedious process which generally 
requires months to complete, even when used in rather 
restricted areas of conventional domains. The product 
of such efforts is usually large quantities of detailed 
information about highly specific realms of expertise. 
Consequently, using results from interview data to make 
meaningful comparisons across knowledge domains becomes 
an arduous, if not impossible, task. 
To further complicate matters, obtaining protocols 
can also be expensive in terms of materials due to the 
largely unconstrained nature of creative activity. An 
expert inventor, for example, may develop many 
prototypes before a satisfactory result is obtained. 
It would therefore be advantageous to develop short-
term laboratory methods, which use simple neutral 
stimuli, to collect more manageable data about the 
characteristics of expert creative problem solvers. 
In a related project, another researcher from our 
lab conducted preparatory interviews with expert 
inventors and proposed several processes that might be 
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important to invention (Weber, Moder, & Solie, 1990). 
One of the most promising constructs identified in the 
interview data was the ability to parse an object into 
its components. In short, parsing delineates the loci 
of variations within a particular object and yields a 
knowledge structure which is similar to the framework 
devised by Minsky (1975). In Minsky's framework 
(sometimes referred to as frames and slots), knowledge 
categories (e.g. fasteners) are defined by their 
various instances which contain at least one common 
characteristic. For example, safety pins, straight 
pins, buttons, snaps, screws, and velcro may range in 
their physical similarities, but they all share the 
common feature of being able to fasten two surfaces. 
Each device, therefore, is an instance of the category 
of fasteners. The instances of categories may be 
referred to as frames, and are in turn composed of 
various characteristics or slots (e.g. the slots of a 
safety pin might be spring, clasp, brace, pin). 
Parsing an object utilizes a similar type of 
knowledge structure. For example, if we wished to 
develop a new type of safety pin (frame), we might 
start by breaking down the safety pin into its 
components of a spring, clasp, brace, and pin (i.e., 
parsing the safety pin into its slots). We might then 
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alter those components in several ways: we may combine 
them with components of other objects, we may change 
their orientation to each other, we may replace the 
component with an analogous component, we may enlarge 
one or all of the components, etc. Furthermore, 
parsing may take place on several levels. Just as we 
can parse an object into components, we can also parse 
components into sub-components. For example, a clasp 
is a component of a safety pin. The material, size, 
shape, operation, or function of the clasp can also be 
parsed. Parsing simply provides the basic data 
structure upon which other transformational processes 
can operate and may therefore be a fundamental 
inventive process. 
We know by definition that expert inventors are 
better inventors than are novice inventors, and if 
parsing is an important inventive procedure, then 
experts may well have different parsing patterns than 
do novices. Furthermore, parsing patterns generated by 
experts should be "better" than those generated by 
novices. Experts may be faster at generating parses, 
or they may generate more parses than do novices. de 
Groot (1965, 1966), however, found that expert chess 
players did not generate more moves in a smaller amount 
of time, but instead, generated qualitatively better 
moves. That is, expert chess players generated moves 
with a greater chance of success or moves which more 
efficiently accomplished a goal. 
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Chase and Simon (1973) used an ingenious 
technique (sometimes known as the "quick glimpse" 
method) for accessing differences between expert and 
novice chess players. Both novice and expert players 
were presented with several chess board configurations 
and were asked to accurately reassemble the pattern 
onto a second chess board. The boards, however, were 
positioned so that the subjects could not look at both 
boards simultaneously. Therefore, the subjects were 
forced to hold the test pattern (or part of the 
pattern) in memory while they reconstructed the pattern 
on the answer board. In analogous terms, they were 
forced to "parse" the chess board configuration because 
the number of chess pieces exceeded short-term memory 
capacity. Furthermore, two types of patterns were used 
as test items: true board configurations, and nonsense 
configurations. True board configurations were 
arrangements which could actually occur during a chess 
match. Nonsense configurations were illegal and random 
patterns of chess pieces that would have a zero 
probability of occurring during a chess match. The 
experts performed no better in the nonsense condition 
than did novice chess players. In the true board 
condition, however, experts performed markedly better 
than did novices. 
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The Chase and simon (1973) study illustrates some 
important distinctions between novice and expert chess 
players. First, it indicates that chess experts do not 
possess a superior short-term memory relative to 
novices. Otherwise, the experts would have out 
performed the novices in both the true board and 
nonsense conditions. Second, the study indicates that 
expert chess players are better at remembering actual 
chess configurations than are novices. This is most 
likely because experts have seen the patterns many 
times and through practice, the configurations have 
been "chunked" (Miller, 1956) into meaningful units. 
This common result of practice and elaboration can be 
demonstrated easily by trying to remember and repeat 
the letter string: e, d, s, 1, u, e, c, h. This is a 
difficult task for most people, but the recall task 
becomes much easier when the same letters are combined 
to form a meaningful unit (e.g. s,c,h,e,d,u,l,e,). 
Thus, in a manner of speaking, chess masters have 
learned to read the chess board like a book, while the 
novices are still learning their ABC's. (Similar 
results have been obtained by de Groot 1965, 1966; 
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Charness, 1976; in computer programming by McKeithen, 
Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981; and Shneiderman, 1980; 
in physics by Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). 
Analogously, parsing may yield the memory chunks 
of expert inventors. The relationships among a 
specified pattern's components determine which 
components belong to which chunks, and the nature of 
the relationships, both within and between chunks, is 
determined by the subject's previous experience within 
the knowledge domain. Parsing identifies/generates 
groups of related components (chunks) present in a 
given pattern and makes the members of that parse 
(chunk) available for other transformational processing 
(in this case, replication). 
If the above findings in conventional problem 
solving domains can be generalized to the more creative 
problem solving realms such as invention then expert 
inventors should be able to divide objects into larger 
units which would allow them to remember the structure 
of those machines better than would novice inventors. 
That is, if the results of the Chase and Simon (1973) 
study are applicable to invention, and parsing is an 
important inventive process, then experts at machine 
invention should produce larger, and thereby fewer, 
parses than novices in reconstructing the same machine. 
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Furthermore, the experts and novices should require an 
equivalent number of parses to reconstruct a non-
functioning nonsense object. The current study was 
conducted to 1) further the understanding of cognitive 
processes used in the inventive process, 2) determine 
whether classic research findings from more 
conventional problem solving domains could be 
effectively demonstrated in a more creative area of 
human problem solving, and 3) use a short-term 
investigative strategy, which utilizes simple neutral 
stimulus materials, to yield data that would permit 
relatively straight forward comparisons with research 
findings in other problem solving domains. 
Method 
Subjects 
The sample consisted of two expert inventors {each 
had designed one patented mechanical device), and two 
novice inventors (senior level, university 
undergraduates who did not have a patent). All four 
subjects were males. The ages of the inventors were 47 
and 49. The ages of the novices were 19 and 22. The 
experts volunteered to participate and received no 
reimbursement for their participation. The novices 
were volunteers and received two extra credit po1nts in 
their experimental psychology course for participating. 
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All four volunteers stated that they had worked with 
Tinker Toys as children and that they spent an average 
of less than 30 minutes a day working with tools or 
machines. On a scale of one to seven with seven being 
the highest degree of enjoyment, both experts rated 
their enjoyment of working with tools as higher than 
average (5 & 6). Both novices rated their degree of 
enjoyment when working with tools as lower than average 
(1 & 3). The novices estimated their mechanical 
aptitude as near average (3 & 4; on a scale of 1 to 7 
with 7 being highest}. The experts also rated their 
mechanical aptitude as near average, although slightly 
higher than the novices' ratings (4 & 5). Both novices 
and one expert denied any formal training in mechanical 
design. The other expert had earned a Masters degree 
in mechanical engineering. 
Materials and Apparatus 
A Pentax color video camera (model# PC-K1500A) and 
a Pentax VHS format portable video cassette recorder 
(model# PZ-R1100A} with time stamping (accurate to .1 
sec.) were used to record the experiment. A Magnavox 
VCR (Model# VR9750AT01) with remote control for super 
slow motion and individual frame advance, connected to 
a KMC television (model# KMC-1921G) were used to score 
the tapes. 
17 
The two stimuli (mechanical and nonsense objects) 
were constructed from Tinker Toys (a building set sold 
by CBS Toys). The mechanical object was constructed 
using 79 Tinker Toys and was an operational model of a 
windmill. The mechanical object was operational in the 
sense that it was composed of a large fan which spun in 
response to certain forms of external forces (i.e. a 
breeze, spinning it with one's finger etc.). The 
energy of the fan was transferred, via two gears, to a 
vertical shaft which would spin as a result of the 
external energy applied to the fan blades. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The nonsense object was constructed of a set of 79 
Tinker Toys which was identical to the set used to 
build the mechanical object. The nonsense object 
resembled no discernable machine, had no moving parts, 
and did not model any obvious utilitarian activity. 
The nonsense object was designed by way of a pseudo-
random construction procedure. First, the set of 79 
pieces were placed in a box. The box was then shaken, 
opened, a piece drawn, and connected to whatever 
structure existed. If there was no place for a piece 
to be connected, it was set aside until an opportunity 
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to be connected arose. The process continued until all 
pieces had been removed from the box and connected to 
the structure. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The stimulus items (mechanical and nonsense 
models) were individually placed in a blind constructed 
of three white poster boards (side = 16"w x 34"h, front 
= 24"w x 34"h, top= 24"1 x 18"w). The front and side 
of the blind had slits (B"w x 6"h) which were covered 
by flaps of white poster board (10"w x 8"h). The blind 
was set atop a standard typing table which had one end 
leaf down. This placed the two slits at approximately 
eye level (46 11 from the floor) for an adult sitting in 
a standard four-caster office chair. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
A wooden conference table (10 1 1 x 32"w) was 
placed length wise in the lab room (12'1 x 5'w). Two 
sets of Tinker Toys (building set #550; approx. 115 
various pieces per set) were placed at one end of the 
table. The subject sat in a four-caster, padded office 
chair at the same end of the conference table where the 
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Tinker Toys had been placed (Figure 3 is a sketch of 
the lab configuration). A line was drawn on the table 
in order to define the work area. None of the 
construction materials or the subjects' construction 
activities were to take place beyond the line because 
they would be outside of camera range. The blind was 
stationed 1' to the left of the table and 1.5' beyond 
the end of the table. The positioning of the table, 
work area, and blind allowed the subjects to easily 
move back and forth between either blind slit and the 
work area. The camera, VCR, and an Amdek Color-I 
monitor were placed at the opposite end of the testing 
room. The camera was placed on a tripod and was 
adjusted so that the subject, the work area, and the 
blind flaps could be simultaneously video taped. The 
monitor was placed so that only the experimenter could 
see the screen. 
Design and Procedure 
All subjects were tested individually, and 
replicated both the mechanical and nonsense objects. 
The order of presentation was balanced across both 
groups (i.e. half of the experts saw the nonsense 
object first as did half of the novices). 
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were asked 
to read and sign a volunteer's consent form. After the 
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subject signed the consent form, the video camera and 
recorder were activated. The experimenter then asked 
several demographic questions. (The results of which 
are stated in the subjects sub-section.) After 
gathering this information, the experimenter read the 
task instructions to the subject and answered any 
questions. The instructions informed the subject that 
their task was to build a replica of the object which 
was in the box beside them. They were further informed 
that they could look in the box as often as they liked, 
but they could only look at the object through the two 
flaps. Participants were also instructed to work as 
quickly as possible, and not to remove the Tinker Toys 
from the work area of the table. This was done to 
prevent subjects from grabbing several materials, 
turning to the box, and assembling the parts in their 
hands while directly viewing the test object. Not 
allowing subjects to simultaneously view the replica 
and original, forced them to depend upon memory in 
order to complete the task. After subjects stated that 
they understood the instructions, subjects were given 
three minutes to familiarize themselves with the 
construction materials in the work area. Following the 
three minute period, the experimenter removed the top 
of the blind to illuminate the object within and asked 
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the subject to look through the side flap at the 
object. Both stimuli were viewed for 60 seconds 
through the side flap, but in the mechanical condition 
the experimenter turned the fan blades in order to 
demonstrate all the moving parts. At the end of the 
initial viewing, the subject was asked to lower the 
flap, return to the work area, and look toward the 
camera. The experimenter then responded to any 
remaining questions. When all questions were answered, 
the experimenter asked the subjects to begin and 
started the camera's internal clock. 
After the subjects had accurately replicated the 
object, they were asked to improve the replica in as 
many ways as they wished. Subjects were also asked to 
"think aloud" while they performed this portion of the 
task. After answering subjects' questions, the 
experimenter asked them to begin and started the clock. 
Upon completing their improvements, subjects were 
asked to completely "break down" the improved replica 
so that no Tinker Toys were connected. This was 
followed by a 10 minute rest period. During the rest 
period, the subject left the testing room, and the 
experimenter exchanged the object in the blind for the 
remaining object. After the 10 minute rest period was 
over, the subject returned to the testing room, and the 
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procedures used for the first object were repeated 
using the second object. Upon completion of the tasks 
involving the second object, subjects were notified of 
the specific purposes of the study, the experimenter 
answered any remaining questions, and the subjects were 
discharged. 
Results 
Scoring 
The video tapes were scored for number of looks, 
the elapsed time during each look, the number of 
connections made during each "look", the number of 
disconnections (errors), and the total time required to 
assemble each object. A "look" trial began when the 
subject's eyes were directed towards one of the two 
blind slits, the flap covering the slit was raised past 
the subjects eye level, and the subject's eyes were 
open. The look trial ended when the subject's eyes 
looked away from the slit, or the flap was lowered past 
eye level. The total assembly time was scored as the 
elapsed time between the experimenter saying "begin" 
and the subject completing his final connection. 
While on the surface the above definition of a 
look may seem complicated, it yielded very reliable 
scores. Two separate scorers scored randomly selected, 
three minute, segments of tape for each subject in each 
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condition. Both scorers generated identical scores for 
each tape segment. 
The mechanical object required 83 connections and 
the nonsense object required 80 connections. 
Extrapolating directly from the Chase and Simon (1973) 
methodology, the number of Tinker Toy pieces assembled 
during each trial seemed to be a reasonable dependent 
measure. When scoring began, however, it became 
apparent that some pieces were assembled when connected 
to one other piece while others required as many as 
nine connections to be considered assembled. For 
example, a short Tinker Toy rod which served as a gear 
tooth was fully assembled when one end was connected to 
the gear hub. The gear hub, however was not assembled 
until all eight gear teeth and an axle were inserted in 
the hub's available openings. That is, each gear tooth 
required only one connection while other materials had 
to be connected to as many 9 other pieces (gear hub) 
before they could be recorded as assembled. Thus, a 
subject might work on assembling parts of several 
pieces in the same look but not fully assemble any one 
piece. If number of pieces assembled was used as the 
dependent measure then these activities would generate 
a score of o for that look. It was also possible that 
a subject might only make three connections during a 
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look which would result in three fully assembled pieces 
and a score of three for a given trial. Thus, even 
though the subject was more productive in the previous 
situations, the dependent variable would indicate no 
subject activity for those trials. 
Number of pieces assembled, therefore, was not an 
accurate representation of the subjects' performance in 
each trial. The number of connections made, rather 
than the number of pieces assembled, was theref9re 
scored as the primary dependent measure. The number of 
disconnections was also recorded and treated as error 
data. 
Analysis 
The first analysis used a 2 (object) x 2 (order) 
analysis of variance for a mixed design to investigate 
order effects (mechanical-nonsense v. nonsense-
mechanical). No significant difference due to the 
order in which stimuli were presented to subjects was 
detected (F(l,2) = 5.76, n.s.). 
For the remaining analyses, a 2 (object) x 2 
(expertise) analysis of variances for a mixed design 
was computed for the average number of correct 
connections made during non-zero tr1als. On several of 
the look trials, subjects would look at the original 
and then look at their reproduction without connecting 
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any pieces. These were considered zero-trials and were 
excluded from the first analysis. The average number 
of correct connections was computed by dividing the 
number of connections required (83 for the mechanical 
object and 80 for the nonsense object) by the number of 
productive looks for that condition. In the nonsense 
condition, novices made an average of 1.84 correct 
connections per look while experts made 1.68 
connections. In the mechanical condition novices also 
outperformed experts, although the differences due to 
expertise were not statistically significant, F(1,2) = 
1.60. The nonsense object was significantly more 
difficult to replicate than the mechanical object, 
F(1,2) = 32.62, p<.05. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Figure 5 represents the outcomes when zero trials 
were included in the analysis. The variance due to 
object type increased (F(1,2) = 70.25, p < .025), but 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
novices still performed better than experts (F(1,2) = 
.33, n.s.), although to a lesser degree. In other 
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words, novices took more non-productive looks at the 
nonsense objects than did experts (see Figure 8). The 
interaction between expertise and object type were 
nonsignificant in both analyses {F{1,2) = 3.42) when 
zero trials were excluded; F{1,2) = 2.63 when zero 
trials were included). 
Experts took longer to complete both replication 
tasks than did novices {See Figure 6). The nonsense 
object required more time to complete even though it 
required fewer connections than the mechanical object. 
The effects due to expertise (F{1,2) = .1) and the 
interaction (F(1,2) = .03) were statistically non-
significant when elapsed time was used as the dependent 
measure. The only statistically significant difference 
in elapsed time was due to the object being replicated, 
F(1,2) = 41.05, Q<.025. 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
As is depicted in Figure 7, experts made more 
disconnections than did novices, and more disconnects 
were performed in the nonsense condition than in the 
mechanical condition. However, neither main effect was 
significant {F{1,2) = 1.18; F{1,2) = 2.95, 
respectively), nor was the interaction, F(1,2) = 1.2. 
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Insert Figure 7 about here 
The only condition in which experts outperformed 
subjects was the number of looks required to assemble 
the nonsense objects (Figure 9). Experts required an 
average of 131.5 looks to assemble the nonsense objects 
whereas novices required an average of 177.5. In the 
mechanical condition, however, experts averaged more 
looks than did novices. Once again the differences due 
Insert Figures 8 & 9 about here 
to expertise were non-significant, F(1,2) = .15. The 
differences due to object type (F(1,2) = 8.55) and the 
interaction between object type and expertise {F{1,2) = 
.5) were also statistically non-significant. 
Discussion of Empirical Findings 
The pattern of data resulting from the current 
study did not produce interaction and main effects 
consistent with the findings of Chase and Simon (1973). 
In the present study, novices consistently outperformed 
experts as measured by any of the various dependent 
measures. The mechanical object, however, was easier 
to replicate than the nonsense object, and the 
differences due to object type were the only effects 
that reached statistical significance. 
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Although sampling error is the most likely 
explanation for the statistically non-significant 
differences due to expertise, a few other extraneous 
influences may have also been at work. First, due to 
difficulties obtaining a sample of expert inventors, 
the average age of, the novices (20.5) was substantially 
less than the experts• mean age (48). The novices• 
younger eyes and hands may have provided a performance 
advantage during the replication task. Also, the 
younger novices may have been slightly more motivated 
because they were receiving extra credit in their 
psychology class, and the experts were volunteering 
their time with no form of reimbursement. During the 
experiment, however, all subjects appeared 
enthusiastic, cooperative, and equally motivated to 
perform the tasks. 
Even though the above mentioned factors were 
present, I believe that they had little, or no, effect 
on the experimental outcome. I think the lack of any 
statistical differences between experts and novices in 
this task is legitimate, and the task, therefore, was 
not able to distinguish between expert and novice 
inventors. Experts and novices performed at 
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approximately the same level in all object conditions, 
and the primary factor accounting for the lack of 
differences is most likely a ceiling effect. While the 
nonsense object appears to have been more difficult 
than the mechanical object, both objects may have been 
too simple and did not require the use of specialized 
knowledge to perform the replication task. Had the 
objects been more complex structures with a more 
sophisticated design then the task may have required 
the experts to utilize more unique knowledge 
structures. Likewise, a more sophisticated design may 
have pushed the novices to the limit of their 
mechanical knowledge. The novices, lacking any 
specialized inventive or mechanical abilities to cope 
with such complex stimuli, would demonstrate a 
performance deficit relative to the experts. Slight 
support for this view comes from the number of looks 
required to replicate each object (see Figure 8). The 
experts required fewer looks to replicate the nonsense 
item than did novices. One implication of this result 
is that the increased complexity of the nonsense object 
may have affected the experts less than the novices. 
While such a singular result is interesting it is still 
highly suspect. Again, one must remember that the 
result was statistically non-significant and the 
observed differences are most likely due to common 
sampling error. 
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One of the goals of this study was an attempt to 
develop a relatively simple, short term method to study 
the nature of human inventiveness. Thus, the choice of 
a simple, neutral machine versus a intricate 
specialized machine was made. There was no a priori 
means to determine how simple, or complex, that machine 
had to be, and the costs of the design complications 
introduced by the use of a more complex stimulus were 
much too high. Even now, it would be difficult to 
determine how sophisticated the machine should be. For 
example, most inventors from mechanical fields probably 
possess a general mechanical aptitude and a high degree 
of specialized knowledge within the field in which they 
have received patents. In the current study, one 
expert received a patent for an improvement in air 
conditioning design, and the other received a patent 
for a modification to a piece of agricultural 
equipment. While it is true that both of these 
subjects would probably have little trouble changing a 
faucet washer, it is also very difficult to say that 
the air conditioning expert could have as easily 
developed the agricultural invention and vice versa. 
The two experts, while possessing similar general 
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aptitudes, and perhaps similar inventive aptitudes, 
simply do not possess the same specialized knowledge 
that allowed them to create their respective 
innovations. Therefore, if a fair comparison is to be 
made, the mechanical object should be of substantial 
complexity to access any unique knowledge structures of 
the expert inventor. If the mechanical device is of 
such complexity then comparing the expert's performance 
to completely naive subjects would be an unfair 
comparison. It would be impossible to determine 
whether any observed performance advantage for the 
expert should be attributed to special inventive 
abilities or simply to greater familiarity with the 
mechanics of the test item. Therefore, the subject 
population would also need to be changed. For example, 
if one could assemble a sample of experts who had a 
patent in air conditioning design then an appropriate 
novice population might be a sample of air conditioning 
service technicians who possessed no patents. 
Obviously, using such procedures would add a great 
deal of time and expense to locate and reimburse such 
professionals for participating in the study. At the 
beginning of this study, it was my hope that such 
complicated studies could be avoided, and I therefore 
attempted to determine whether the use of a neutral, 
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simple machine could be used to demonstrate any 
cognitive abilities unique to inventors. 
Unfortunately, no concrete conclusions about the nature 
of human inventiveness have been uncovered as a result 
of the current study. 
The fact that experts and novices performed at an 
equivalent level when given neutral, relatively simple 
objects to replicate is, however, consistent with the 
idea that the specialized cognitive structures which 
make invention possible are most likely tightly bound 
to the specialized knowledge of the domain in which the 
inventor works. The possible exception to this rule 
may be those rare cases of particularly gifted 
inventors (e.g. Edison) who seem able to translate 
their inventive capacities to a variety of fields. 
Even in these rare cases, however, it seems clear that 
such inventors must exert great effort to become 
competent in a new domain, and only after a obtaining a 
relatively high level of understanding of a new domain 
can they develop truly unique inventions. (I will 
return to this point and attempt to describe why this 
may be the case in the last section of the paper.) 
While the primary goal of the research was to 
identify processes and abilities that distinguish 
inventors from the general population, a secondary goal 
/ 
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was to develop a methodology which would allow for 
relatively straightforward comparisons between this 
study and other studies of expertise in diverse 
domains. Furthermore, I wanted to develop a 
methodology which eliminated the complexities involved 
with protocol analyses of experts' verbal reports. The 
project was only partially successful in achieving 
these two secondary goals. Conceptually replicating 
the Chase and Simon (1973) study did provide data that 
allow reasonable comparison between this study and 
similar studies in other domains. Furthermore, I was 
able to investigate inventive expertise without the use 
of verbal reports. 
The present methodology unfortunately introduced 
an entirely new set of analytical difficulties. First, 
scoring the tapes was a time consuming process to put 
it mildly. Every minute of tape required approximately 
two hours of effort to score and verify. The present 
data represents approximately 160 hours of scoring not 
including analysis, time required to set up the scoring 
equipment, or breaks required to maintain accurate 
scoring. When all the other "real-time" factors were 
included, more than one semester of daily scoring 
activity was requ1red to score and verify the data from 
this study. Therefore, while the data generated from 
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the current methodology are somewhat more objective 
than the data commonly generated from experts' 
introspections about their actions, the scoring effort 
remains comparable to the effort required by protocol 
analyses. 
The major cause of the difficulty surrounding the 
scoring was the vigilance required to score the onset 
and offset of looks. Scoring the number of looks was 
originally planned to be a simple matter of counting 
flap openings and closings. Unfortunately, the scoring 
quickly became a process in which the scorer had to 
determine when the flap was raised past the eyes, the 
eyes were directed toward the flap, and the eyes were 
open. Simply counting the number of flap openings and 
recording the length of time that the flap is open 
would have resulted in inaccurate results. Subjects 
tended to open the flap and glance at the stimulus 
(look beginning), then glance at their replication 
(look ends), and then back at the stimulus (a new look 
begins). They would often look back and forth several 
times before closing the flap once and returning to the 
work table. Although determining the point at which a 
look begins, and ends, involves monitoring three 
conditions, and consumed much of the scoring effort, 
the use of a super slow motion VCR with frame advance 
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made the determination very accurate and reliable. 
As is generally the case in science, the result of 
the present study is a mixed bag. The research did not 
produce a methodology which accesses invention 
processes without requiring labor intensive scoring 
efforts. The study did, however, produce objective 
data that could be compared to studies from other 
knowledge domains. Unfortunately, the data did not 
produce results consistent with the Chase and Simon 
(1973) findings, but the results do hint at one 
potentially important characteristic of inventors. 
Before an interested individual can become an inventor, 
it may be necessary to acquire extensive knowledge of a 
domain before she can create a unique, patent quality, 
invention within that domain. While inventive ability 
and domain knowledge are hardly synonymous, they may be 
highly inter-related. That is, inventive processes are 
most likely high level processes that can only utilize 
knowledge structures which have a compatible level of 
sophistication. In other words, the inventor may have 
to obtain a fairly high level of comprehension within a 
domain before any useful, unique, inventive procedures 
can be effectively applied. Therefore, the development 
of experimental techniques, which can disentangle the 
inventive procedures from the domain specific 
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knowledge, may hold the greatest promise for unlocking 
the nature of human inventiveness. 
Theoretical Discussion 
Two Perspectives on Cognition 
Following World War II, a new technology, the 
computer, was beginning to proliferate throughout the 
scientific and technical community. The von Neumann 
architecture was, and still remains, the most widely 
applied computer architecture. A von Neumann machine 
contains two primary components: a central processing 
unit (CPU) and a central memory array. The CPU 
contains registers which are small memory elements that 
can contain one "chunk" of information (usually an 
address of a central memory location, or a numeric 
value read from an address in the central memory). The 
machine operates by executing a pre-programmed sequence 
of instructions which is stored in the central memory 
array. The CPU begins by fetching the first 
instruction in the sequence from the central memory 
array. Next, the CPU performs the operation indicated 
by the instruction and may write the result of the 
operation back out to a location in the central memory. 
The CPU then obtains the next instruction in the 
sequence and the process repeats itself until the final 
instruction in the sequence is executed. In the von 
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Neumann architecture, the CPU and memory are separate 
components and information is represented explicitly in 
individual memory locations. The processor of a von 
Neumann machine can, at any one time, perform only a 
single operation from a sequence of operations, and von 
Neumann computers are, therefore, best described as 
serial machines. 
The serial computer provided scientists and 
engineers with a tool which was flexible enough to 
model complex systems and thereby allowed them to 
build, control, and attain a higher understanding of 
such systems. The human brain is certainly one of the 
most complex systems known to science, and even though 
human cognition is probably far more intricate than the 
most sophisticated post-war computing process, it did 
not take long before researchers began drawing 
analogies between human thought and computer processing 
(Turing, 1950; von Neumann, 1958). By the mid 1960's 
the computer-mind metaphor was the dominate metaphor 
driving psychological investigations and the von 
Neumann machine was firmly entrenched as the dominate 
computing device. It should therefore come as no 
surprise, that human cognition had become characterized 
in terms of serial information processing stages. 
Viewing human cognition in terms of sequential symbolic 
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processes, resulted in substantial advances in computer 
language designs, human factors, linguistics, 
artificial intelligence, human learning and memory, 
cognition, and human problem solving. Almost from the 
beginning of the information processing revolution 
however, there were detractors who warned against 
taking the serial computer-mind metaphor too literally. 
A major criticism of the computer-mind metaphor 
arose from the differences between the actual 
neurological organization of the human brain and the 
dualistic organization of process and memory in the von 
Neumann computer. How could scientists, who were 
supposed to be concerned with truth and accuracy, so 
willingly embrace serial models of cognition when there 
existed such an obv1ous discrepancy between the models 
and the supposed underlying physiological mechanisms? 
The answer was, of course, that the information 
processing theories operated at a level of explanation 
which was higher than the level of explanation utilized 
by neurological theorists. The information processing 
camp affirmed the symbol as the fundamental component 
of human cognition and thus, their explanations 
supposedly did not extend to processes which operated 
below the symbolic level. The information processing 
investigators undertook the task of creating symbols 
for objects, relations, operations, and any other 
cognitive component that they deemed pertinent. The 
human mind was viewed as a symbol processor and any 
process which operated below the level of the symbol 
was seen as a topic more suited to neuroscience. 
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The last two decades of advances in AI/expert 
systems, human problem solving, cognitive psychology, 
and the information sciences serves as a testament to 
the power of explanation at the symbolic level. 
However, as all worthwhile paradigms must do 
eventually, the conventional information processing 
approach illuminated human cognitive capabilities which 
could not be adequately modeled with a sequential 
symbolic processor (e.g., continuous speech 
recognition, dynamic pattern recognition, visual scene 
interpretation, content addressable memory, and 
autonomous vehicles). The processing models of the 
neural realists had always seemed to possess the 
potential for dealing with such problems, and by the 
1980's the technology and computational models had 
developed sufficiently to use them successively in both 
applied and theoretical realms. 
The modern work on artificial neural models 
actually began more than 40 years ago with work done by 
Hebb (1949), McCulloch and Pitts (1943), and Rosenblatt 
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(1959) but, their efforts were stymied by a lack of 
technology and the early successes with symbolic 
processing systems. The recent resurgence in neural 
theories began in earnest during the mid 1980's with 
work by Hopfield (1982, 1984, 198G), Kohonen (1984), 
Grossberg (198Ga, 198Gb), Feldman & Ballard (1982), 
Hillis (198G), and Rumelhart and McClelland (198Ga, 
198Gb) and represents an exciting possibility for 
cognitive, neurologic, and computing research. 
Undoubtedly, neural net theories will be a great boon 
to those who are working on "monster" AI problems such 
as those mentioned above, and to neural scientists who 
wish to model human neural systems on a computer. One 
of the most exciting prospects for neural computing, 
however, lies in coupling the past successes of the 
symbolic serialists with the power provided by the new 
neural networks. For the first time, we may possess 
the theoretical rudiments necessary to begin developing 
a complete model of human cognition which encompasses 
the higher level, apparently sequential processes of 
the human mind and the highly parallel mechanisms which 
underlie those processes. The purpose of this portion 
of the dissertation is to explore how neural and 
traditional models may be integrated so that new 
insights might be gained about one aspect of high-level 
41 
cognitive processing, namely, human problem solving. 
The first section will provide an overview of 
Newell and Simon's (1972} influential work on human 
problem solving by discussing the underlying 
assumptions of traditional human problem solving 
theory, defining some basic terms, and describing the 
general process of problem solving. The following 
section will provide an overview of neural networks by 
discussing the underlying assumptions of neural 
computing, defining fundamental terminology, describing 
two representative neural nets, and lastly, 
highlighting the tasks which neural nets most easily 
lend themselves. The next section represents a first 
attempt at uniting the two views of cognition by 
describing a common data structure, formulating an 
integrated processing model for applied expert systems 
problems, and discussing a general, unified model of 
creativity and invention. The final section will 
summarize the previous sections and make some rather 
modest predictions for the future of neural computing 
and problem solving. 
The Conventional Information 
Processing Perspective 
In 1972 Allen Newell and Herbert Simon authored 
the highly influential book, Human Problem Solving, 
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which, as the title implies, was an effort to advance 
the understanding of human problem solving. The 
fundamental postulate of the Newell and Simon theory is 
that humans operate as an information processing system 
or IPS (p.19). According to Newell and Simon, an IPS 
consists of three primary components: I/O mechanisms, 
a processor, and a memory (see Figure 10). 
Furthermore, an IPS resides in an external world that 
contains the task information and all the physical 
entities with which the IPS must deal. 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
The three components of the IPS, (the I/O 
mechanisms, the processor, and the memory), comprise 
any IPS's general architecture. The I/0 mechanisms are 
divided into two general categories: receptors and 
effectors. The receptors receive information from the 
external world and pass it to the processor. If the 
IPS of interest is a human then the receptors are 
analogous to eyes, ears, and the other senses. If the 
processor selects an output which must be manifested in 
the external world, the action is performed by the 
effectors. Again, if the IPS of interest is a human 
then the effectors are abstractions of hands, feet, 
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mouth, or any other physical component which can 
directly affect the external world. Newell and simon 
divorce their problem solving theory from any detailed 
concern with the sensory mechanisms and it should be 
made clear that the primary components of an IPS 
operate at a level that is more abstract than the 
sensory or motor processes. The processor consists of 
three components: a fixed set of elementary information 
processes (eips); a small, limited short term memory 
(STM) that can hold only a few symbol structures at any 
one time; and an interpreter which determines the 
sequence of operations to be executed by the IPS. The 
last component of the IPS is the large, virtually 
unlimited long term memory which holds the symbol 
structures until the processor requires them in its 
short term memory. 
The IPS operates by accumulating information about 
the external world via the receptors. The input from 
the receptors is passed to the STM of the processor. 
The processor then locates, by invoking eips, symbol 
structures in memory that represent the external 
objects and events. The symbol structures are then 
passed to the processor and based upon the pattern of 
activated symbol structures (i.e. the context), the 
interpreter composes sequences of operations from the 
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set of available elementary information processes. The 
resulting operations may animate the effectors andfor 
cause the activation, modification, and/or creation of 
symbol structures in memory. 
In specifying an IPS capable of performing a 
desired task, one must first define a set of 
fundamental symbol manipulation procedures known as 
elementary information processes (eips). The eips 
combine with the symbol structures to define an IPS's 
total range of capabilities. The IPS's entire behavior 
is produced by executing sequences of the eips. These 
simple processes can be combined to build more and more 
complex procedures until an integrated problem solving 
behavior emerges. Just what makes a process an 
elementary process depends upon the purposes of the 
particular application. The eips must be general and 
powerful enough to generate the full range of behaviors 
necessary to solve a specified problem. Furthermore, 
the eips must be realizable by known mechanisms. For 
example, there is no reason to take problem solving as 
an eip for it would tell us nothing about how problem 
solving is accomplished. The set of possible eips is 
not unlimited, but a unique set of eips capable of 
resolving all problems does not currently exist. In 
fact, the quest for a limited set of eips capable of 
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resolving all symbolically representable problems is 
one of the computing sciences' cornerstones. 
Perhaps Newell and Simon's most ubiquitous 
theoretical element is the symbol, and a primitive 
symbol is the most basic form of a symbol. Like the 
eips, the definition of a primitive symbol depends upon 
the current application. For example, if one wished to 
define an IPS capable of understanding speech, then one 
might select the phonemes as the atomic structures of 
speech and assign a primitive symbol to each phoneme. 
By designating phonemes with primitive symbols, the 
resulting model of speech processing would disregard 
any process or knowledge which occurs below the 
phonemic level (e.g. sound wave forms, the 
physiological processes by which phonemes are detected, 
and the perceptual processes by which phonemes are 
recognized). In general, the definition of eips and 
primitive symbols is determined by the degree of 
specificity with which one wishes to define an IPS. 
' Primitive symbols perform three primary functions. 
First, primitive symbols designate specific events or 
structures in the external world. Such primitive 
symbols may be evoked when their referent occurs in the 
external world of the IPS, or their presence within the 
IPS may cause the IPS to create such events or 
---------
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structures externally. Second, primitive symbols may 
designate eips or sequences of eips so that the 
referent can be activated by the interpreter. Lastly, 
primitive symbols can be connected via relations to 
produce more complex symbol structures. 
As an example, consider the action of turning on a 
light switch. First, one must define the eips for the 
IPS which is to perform the action. For present 
purposes, the IPS has four eips available to it 
(locate-switch, touch-switch, move-finger, return-to-
previous-state). It should be clear that the 
words/symbols which designate eips are just labels. 
That is, the symbols have no inherent meaning to the 
IPS other than being a unique designation for the 
action(s) to be performed. I could have labeled them 
Al, A2, A3, and A4, but I have instead chosen to 
designate them with symbols which more adequately 
describe their actions to us as external observers of 
the IPS. We can now combine these four actions (eips) 
into a sequence of actions and designate the sequence 
with the symbol "flip-switch". Now if the IPS 
encounters a situation in which the context requires 
the flipping of a light switch, it need only activate 
the symbol structure 11 flip-sw1tch" and the four step 
sequence of "locate-switch", "touch-switch", "move-
finger", and "return-to-previous-state" will be 
executed. 
47 
The advantage of viewing a problem solver as an 
information processing system lies in the fact that an 
IPS uses an interpreter which only requires a small, 
finite amount of mechanism (i.e. the eips). However, 
symbols, which can be used to designate eips, can be 
arranged in very complex ways. Therefore, the 
complexity of an IPS's behavior (sequences of eips) is 
limited only by the complexity of the symbol structures 
that can be built up in memory. 
The power of symbols lies in their ability to 
designate (i.e. to have a referent). The primary 
designatory relationship is between a symbol and a 
symbol structure • Thus, the symbol X2 may designate 
the symbol structure (CAT). The ability to designate 
means an information process can take a symbol as input 
and gain access to the referenced object, or action, in 
order to affect it or be affected by it in some way. 
For example, an information process is given the symbol 
TABBY which refers to the symbol structure (own cat 
black male). Likewise, if the information process is 
given the symbol structure (own cat black male) the 
symbol TABBY can be produced. Given the symbol or 
symbol structure an information process can then 
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operate on that symbol, the object in the external 
world to which it refers, or use that symbol structure 
to affect another symbol structure. In short, a symbol 
can be used to encode information about any conceivable 
thing and can hence operate as a surrogate for that 
thing within the IPS. 
In general, an IPS operates by locating symbols 
and performing sequences of actions (eips) based upon 
the context provided by the symbol patterns held in the 
processor's STM. The component of the processor which 
determines the sequence of operations is the 
interpreter. The fundamental assumption of the Newell 
and Simon theory is that an interpreter will operate in 
a lawful fashion. That is, given the exact situational 
context (same pattern of activated symbols), an 
interpreter will generate a functionally similar or 
exact sequence of operations. The behavior of an IPS 
is therefore predictable if one can determine the 
conditions under which certain sequences of behaviors 
are generated by its interpreter. In accordance with 
this assumption, a fundamental task for an inductive 
scientist, who wishes to study human problem solving, 
is to observe an IPS in order to hypothesize a program 
for the IPS's behavior. A program, in Newell and 
Simon's terms, is a set of rules and regularities that 
describe the sequences of eips which the interpreter 
executes as a function of its current informational 
context. 
49 
The second general obligation of problem solving 
theorists, according to Newell and Simon, is 
determining the extent to which the IPS actually runs 
according to the program which has been specified for 
it. It should be made clear that a program is purely 
external to the IPS. A program is our way, as external 
observers, of describing the system. A program should 
be understood as a theory which describes the operation 
of a system in information processing terms. If the 
interpreter of an IPS is a true interpreter (i.e. 
generates sequences of operations based upon symbolic 
structures in predictable ways), then we can also 
describe the internal structure of the interpreter with 
information processing terms. However, there may be 
nothing inside the system itself that corresponds 
directly to the program, but only a mechanism that 
behaves in the manner described by the program. For 
example, the behavior of a thermostat may be adequately 
described by the follow1ng program taken from Newell 
and Simon (1972, pp 31). 
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Insert Figure 11 about here 
The thermostat however, has no interpreter which 
processes symbolic structures. The thermostat contains 
only a simple mercury switch that behaves in the manner 
described by the program. At some level then, an 
interpreter is just a mechanism which directly 
accomplishes the actions described by the program. If 
the interpreter of an IPS is actually a mechanism that 
simply produces a sequence of behaviors (e.g. mercury 
switch) then we cannot describe its actual internal 
structure in information processing terms. Only 
examination of the microstructure of the system in 
question will determine the actual mechanisms at work 
within an IPS, but even in this case, a program will 
remain an adequate description and predictor of the 
IPS's behavior. 
Problem Solving Information Process1ng Systems 
A problem solving situation consists of two 
general constructs; a problem solving system and a task 
environment. A problem solving system is simply any 
IPS capable of selecting and executing actions in order 
to achieve specified goals. Although Newell and Simon 
never speak of a problem solving system in this way, it 
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is apparent that the problem solving system represents 
the lower limit of their theory and equates roughly to 
any physical platform capable of problem solving 
activity (i.e. selecting and executing actions to 
achieve goals). As they indicate several times, the 
physiology or the true underlying structure of the IPS 
is not important for describing the behavior of the 
system. The problem solving system, therefore, is left 
largely undefined and can be any system capable of 
meeting the generic description of an IPS (human, 
chimp, computer, thermostat, etc.). 
The task environment can be generally defined as 
an environment coupled with a task, goal, or problem 
for which a problem solver is adequately motivated to 
complete. The task environment contains all the 
information and objects necessary for the problem 
solver to produce a correct solution, but the task 
environment may also contain objects and information 
which may interfere with, disrupt, limit, and/or block 
some solution paths. It is natural, albeit incorrect, 
to think of the task environment as being entirely 
external to the subject. In fact, the inherit 
capabilities of the subject such as generalized 
intelligence and level of experience (master v. novice 
chess players) are also components of the task 
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environment. The task environment includes, but is not 
strictly limited to, the goal of the problem, the 
conditions under which the goal can be obtained, the 
legal tools and operations that can be used to obtain 
the goal, the inherit problem solving capacities of the 
solver, and the starting state of the problem. 
A problem exists when a goal is desired by a 
system that does not possess an immediately available 
method to obtain the goal. Even though all the tools 
and informat1on necessary to solve the problem may be 
immediately available in the task environment of the 
problem solver, a solution path to the goal may not be 
forthcoming because the TRUE problem does not exist in 
the external world, but is created within the problem 
solving system. To illustrate this point, consider 
what might happen if two people are presented with an 
identical problem in an identical external environment. 
It is quite possible, even likely, that the two 
individuals will perform the same task in different 
ways. In fact, a single individual is likely to 
perform different behavioral sequences during separate 
exposures to the same problem. If the problems are the 
same and the external environment of the subject is the 
same then the performance differences must be 
attributed to some variation within the problem solving 
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system. In Newell and Simon's framework, a problem 
solver is characterized as an IPS which builds an 
internal representation of the task environment in 
order to produce a solution to a given problem. The 
IPS's internal representation contains all the 
information relevant to the problem including tools, 
operations, capacities of the problem solver, problem 
states, goals, and any other useful concepts which the 
problem solving system may have available to describe 
the problem situation (e.g. knowledge gained from 
experience in other task domains). 
The internal representation of all the information 
relevant to the problem is labeled the problem space 
(see Newell & Simon, 1972; p. 56- 86). The problem 
space is not a physical space which can be pointed to, 
but is instead the essence of the problem which exists 
within the problem solver's cognitive machinery. 
Although a problem space can be represented externally 
with game trees, productions, magic squares, and other 
symbolic structures, these structures are not the true 
problem space. In linguistic terms, the game tree and 
other symbolic structures are analogous to the surface 
structure of language while the true problem space is 
analogous to the deep structure of language. The 
composition of the internal problem space determines 
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the nature of the TRUE problem, the behaviors that the 
system will perform in attempting to solve the problem, 
and whether or not the problem can be solved by a 
system operating within the given task environment. 
Attainment of a goal becomes a problem when the 
number of plausible routes to the goal is large or 
immense, the correct solution paths are widely 
dispersed throughout that huge set of plausible 
solutions, and the cost of obtaining and testing each 
possible solution is high. A problem solver therefore 
constructs an internal representation of all factors 
deemed pertinent (i.e. the problem space) in order to 
manage the immense amount of potentially relevant 
information. The task environment's relevant 
components (e.g. the goals, legal tools and operations, 
and the initial state of the problem) are all 
represented in the problem space. The problem space 
also provides various imagined intermediate steps 
towards a solution. The problem space can therefore be 
used to internally generate and test solution paths 
(sequences of mental and motor activity which may or 
may not lead to a goal) without actually having to 
perform the associated behaviors. The problem space 
thus represents the set of possible solution paths 
which are available to the problem solver. Learning is 
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therefore the process of composing, editing, and 
retaining an internal problem space which allows the 
problem solver to most effectively derive the correct 
solution path for any problem selected from a specified 
class of problems (e.g., 4*3 is a problem selected from 
the class of multiplication problems). Accordingly, 
problem solving is the process of deriving the correct 
solution path from the internal problem space, and is 
therefore internal to the problem solver. 
Consequently, the true problem (i.e. deriving the 
correct solution path(s) from the internal problem 
space) and the resultant problem solving behaviors are 
determined by the structure of the internal problem 
space. Furthermore, because the problem space is 
internal to the problem solver and thereby unknowable 
to an external observer, the true problem and the 
behavior of the problem solving system are likewise 
unknowable to an external observer prior to the 
execution of those behaviors. 
We can know, however, the external stimuli and 
some of the problem solver's intrinsic capacities (i.e. 
portions of the task environment), and based upon the 
demands of the task environment, one can fabricate a 
hypothetical problem space. Task demands are 
constraints on the behavior of the problem solver which 
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must be satisfied in order for the goal to be obtained 
(e.g., you must have three-in-a-row to win in tic-tac-
toe, sufficient IQ, level of experience, short-term 
memory capacity). An analysis of the task environment 
produces a description of the task demands which, in 
turn, establish possible solution paths while rendering 
other solution paths inaccessible to the problem 
solver. The inaccessible paths are not, therefore, 
components of the subject's problem space. 
For example, a subject may be placed in an 
environment where he must obtain $2000. The rules of 
the subject's society, and personal moral code, may 
provide task demands by disallowing homicide or theft 
as viable solution paths. The capacities of the 
problem solver may also provide task demands. If he 
cannot read or write, or if he has no collateral of 
value equal to $2000, he may not be able to obtain a 
loan from an accredited lending institution. Each of 
these constraints, and many more, may disallow certain 
solution paths while defining other paths. By 
carefully analyzing the task environment, which 
involves ident1fying capacities of the environment and 
the problem solver, one can build a hypothetical 
problem space devoid of irrelevant solution paths and 
generate a set of prototypic path features which could 
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lead a problem solver to a correct solution. 
A hypothetical problem space is a representation 
of the behavior demanded by the task environment given 
a perfectly rational problem solver operating at 
specified level of adaptivity. A problem solving 
system is considered perfectly rational if the behavior 
exhibited by the system in a specified problem solving 
situation is appropriate given the demands of the task 
environment. If a task environment demands certain 
behaviors and a problem solver exhibits those behaviors 
then those behaviors tell us more about the task 
environment than about the subject other than he/she is 
adequately motivated and equipped to perform the task. 
It is when actual human behavior deviates from the 
behavior predicted by the perfectly rational model that 
we begin to discover something about human rationality. 
The demands of the task environment and the 
psychology of the subject, are the components which 
Newell and Simon regard as the two most important 
aspects of human problem solving. Therefore, the first 
step of the general methodology proposed by Newell and 
Simon is analysis of the task environment in order to 
determine the task demands. Second, based upon the 
task demands, one constructs a hypothetical problem 
space from a specified set of eips and symbol 
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structures. Subsequently, a perfectly rational problem 
solving system is created by allowing an IPS to operate 
with the hypothetical problem space in the specified 
task environment. Next, one observes humans performing 
the same task in the same environment and identifies 
the differences between the behaviors of the humans and 
the perfectly rational IPS. Lastly, the differences 
between actual human behavior and the perfectly 
rational behavior of the IPS are used to develop a 
model of the human's actual problem space. 
As an example, given the following tic-tac-toe 
board configuration and model of a perfectly rational 
Insert Figure 12 about here 
problem solver, X's most rational next move should be 
in the lower center square. This is the move that is 
demanded by the task environment to achieve three-in-a-
row. It is when behavior deviates from this rational 
model of behavior that we learn something about the 
psychology of the subject. If the subject is motivated 
to win the game and has the cognitive capabilities to 
achieve that goal, then why would she play in the right 
hand center square? Perhaps she was looking for two 
contiguous squares that contained her pieces and when 
she did not find that configuration, she employed a 
rule that stated: if your opponent has marks on two 
contiguous squares and an open square in line with 
those two squares then place your mark in the open 
square. The subject's deviation from the perfectly 
rational model has given us a clue about her internal 
representation of the problem and allows us to modify 
our perfectly rational model. 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
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In the above case, the subject's representation is 
slightly flawed because it effectively omits the 
possibility that two non-contiguous pieces can 
represent a winning move. The study of problem solving 
need not, and should not, be limited only to those 
cases where we can build a superior rational model to 
that of the human subject. In fact, the study of human 
problem solving is most interesting and beneficial when 
our scrutiny turns to the task environments of experts 
who have obtained rare and superior abilities. For 
example, an investigator may be interested in 
determining the most successful chess strategies, and a 
sound investigative method would be to examine the play 
of a senior chess master. In most cases, an 
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investigator could not create a hypothetical problem 
space for chess which is superior to a senior chess 
master's internal representation. When the term 
"perfectly rational" is applied to a problem solving 
system, it refers only to the fact that the system's 
problem space is a reasonable description of the task 
environment and task demands, but implies nothing about 
the efficacy of the problem space. That is, a problem 
solving system can be perfectly rational without being 
perfectly successful. 
For example, a perfectly rational chess playing 
computer might operate by examining all possible board 
configurations following each of the opponent's moves 
in order to determine which of its available moves has 
the highest probability of success. The computer may 
be able to win, but due to the sheer number of possible 
combinations, a single match might take years to 
complete. Furthermore, if the computer were to compete 
in another chess playing domain, namely lightening 
chess, it would be soundly defeated. The hypothetical 
problem space and the perfectly rational behavior of an 
IPS are merely starting points, or straw-man 
constructs, to which human behavior can be compared. 
The behavior of the human experts will almost surely 
deviate from the behaviors predicted by the perfectly 
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rational models. One can then modify or create new and 
better models of human problem solving as one increases 
the understanding of exactly how the experts' behaviors 
differ from the predicted behaviors. After 
modifications based upon the experts' performance, the 
hypothetical problem spaces can be represented in a 
problem solving grammar (e.g. production systems, game 
trees) and made available to non-experts in order to 
increase their understanding of a particular task 
environment. In fact, the major benefit of Newell & 
Simon's approach to the study of human problem solving 
is not that it allows one to build automatons capable 
of performing tasks which have heretofore been 
considered uniquely human, but that the knowledge which 
results from their approach is communicable to other 
human beings and can therefore be used to enlighten, 
educate, and improve human performance. 
The Problem Solving Process 
The essential components of the problem solving 
situation, the task environment, the IPS, and the 
internal representation of the problem (problem space), 
have now been defined, and a general methodology for 
the study of human problem solving has been sketched. 
The only remaining preliminary construct that needs to 
be outlined is the process by which an IPS can actually 
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solve a problem within a specified task environment. 
The process of solving a problem begins with the 
act of input translation. During this phase of the 
process, the IPS creates an internal representation of 
the problem (i.e. the problem space) which may render 
solutions obvious, obscure, or even unattainable. 
After the problem is represented internally and based 
upon the formulation of the internal problem space, the 
IPS selects a problem solving method. A method can be 
viewed as a general strategy or a specified sequence of 
elementary information processes that, when executed, 
will achieve, or attempt to achieve, a desired goal. 
Once begun, a method controls both internal and 
external behav1ors of the IPS, but its control is not 
absolute. That is, a method can be halted and once it 
is stopped, the system has four options. First, 
another method may be selected and tried. Second, 
another internal representation may be selected and the 
entire problem reformulated. Third, all attempts to 
solve the problem may be discontinued (i.e. the problem 
solver gives up), and fourth, the method reaches a 
successful conclusion. 
As stated earlier, the IPS is fundamentally serial 
in nature. That is, an IPS is capable of selecting and 
executing only one method at a time. It should be made 
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clear, however, that at lower operational levels (e.g. 
perception), an IPS may have parallel capabilities. 
That is to say, an IPS may recognize many things at 
once, but responds to them with only a single action at 
a time. After settling on an internal problem space, 
the general behavior of a problem solving IPS can be 
described as iterative: select a goal; select a 
method; execute the method; evaluate results; select 
new goal (or subgoal). The behavior of an IPS, 
however, can also be characterized as recursive. 
During the course of its operation a method may produce 
more than one sequence of potentially successful 
behaviors. Therefore, the system may continue on one 
branch while retaining a stack of indexes to other 
pending branches so that control can return to a given 
point upon failure of the attempted subgoal. 
The process of problem solving, as posited by 
Newell and Simon, is controlled by two constructs; the 
problem formulation as determined by the structure of 
the problem space and the methods which, in turn, are 
selected upon the basis of the problem formulation. 
The subjects which Newell and Simon studied tended to 
be well rehearsed in their task domains and therefore, 
did not often change their internal representations of 
the problems. Consequently, their original theory 
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stated little about creating internal representations 
or shifting from one internal problem space to another. 
Most of their theoretical work therefore, did not focus 
on the specifics of the internal representation but 
focused instead on problem solving methods. 
In order for a method to be useful, it must be 
general enough to be applied to any problem selected 
from a specified class of problems. Generalizable 
methods are created by allowing the methods to contain 
variables which are instantiated with specific relevant 
information from the current problem space. The 
problem space, in most cases, represents more 
information than is required by the method. The 
problem formulation serves as the interface between the 
problem space and the methods by designating a specific 
method and the information contained in the problem 
space that is to be used by the method. In effect, a 
problem formulation and its associated method serve to 
reduce the portion of the problem space which must be 
considered in order to solve the problem. 
For example, a problem solver is given the goal of 
finding all the words which can be found in the word 
"xylophone". If the problem is formulated as "find the 
words which already exist in "xylophone"" then the 
method labeled read_words(x) may be activated. The 
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method read_words(x) would instantiate x to "xylophone 11 
and, by means of several elementary information 
processes (eips), would read the words which exist in 
xylophone (i.e. lop, hone, phone, one, on). on the 
other hand, if the problem were formulated as 
"rearrange the letters of "xylophone" to form all 
possible letter combinations that are words 11 , then the 
problem solver may use a different method (e.g. 
find_all_legal_combinations(x)). Both of the above 
cases require lexical searches, but the former problem 
formulation requires fewer lexical searches 
(9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1 or 45 possible combinations versus 
9!/2! (total permutations divided by permutations of 
duplicate letters) or 181,440 possible combinations). 
Consequently, the former problem formulation and method 
reduce the problem space by a greater degree and thus, 
define a problem which is easier to solve. 
The problem solving process can now be summarized 
as follows. A problem solver is placed in a task 
environment and forms an internal problem space which 
represents, but is not limited to, the initial state, 
the goal, and plausible intermediate steps towards that 
goal. Next, the problem solver formulates the problem 
based upon the information represented in the problem 
space (including relevant information gained from other 
66 
experiences). The problem formulation and its 
associated method may reduce the size of the problem 
space and thereby, the number of elements which need be 
considered in locating a solution. The problem solver 
then applies the method to all the elements in the 
remaining subspace, and if the problem is formulated 
correctly (i.e. the proper method is applied to the 
proper subset of elements), then the goal will be 
attained. 
Newell and Simon describe three general types of 
problem formulations and concomitant methods: 
recognition, set-predicatejgenerate-and-test, and 
heuristic search. Recognition is used in familiar task 
environments where a solution can be obtained 
immediately from memory by simply examining the 
knowledge gained from previous, often well rehearsed 
problem solving situations (e.g. 9*4=?). In general, 
problem solving proceeds by reducing the problem into 
more manageable tasks. Eventually, however, the 
reductionism must be stopped and sub-tasks performed. 
Recognition is a special case of problem solving and is 
important because it is often the method employed in 
the most elementary sub-tasks. That is, problem 
solving usually, if not always, proceeds by reducing 
the problem to tasks for which the problem solver 
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already possesses answers. Thus, reducing the problem 
to sub-tasks stops when a solution can be found by 
simple pattern matching (i.e. recognition). 
The second and most general type of problem 
statement is the set-predicate formulation. In this 
problem formulation, the problem solver is given a set 
of elements (E), and the goal of locating an element 
that has specified properties. As stated earlier, a 
method can use only that information which is 
designated by the problem formulation. The set-
predicate formulation only provides a method with the 
elements contained in set E and the properties which an 
element must possess in order to be judged as a member 
of the goal set (G). 
The method which makes the most obvious use of the 
information provided by the set-predicate formulation 
is known as the generate-and-test method. The method 
operates simply by generating the elements of E and 
testing each element for the properties required for 
membership in G. The generate-and-test method and the 
set-predicate problem formulation are quite general and 
will always be successful provided that the properties 
of the goal set are formulated correctly, the set of 
possible solutions is finite, and the generator is 
allowed to operate long enough. The amount of time 
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required to locate the solution(s) will depend upon the 
amount of time required to generate each element in the 
problem space, the time required to test each generated 
element, the size of the problem space, and the 
relative position of the solution(s) within the problem 
space. 
The third problem formulation type is the 
heuristic search formulation and is characterized as a 
search for a path through the problem space which will 
lead from an initial state to a goal state. In one 
sense, the set-predicate and heuristic search 
formulations are quite similar. Each view the problem 
space as a set of elements which must be tested in 
order to determine if that element is a member of the 
goal set. In the set-predicate formulation, however, 
the generate and test operations are binary and 
completely independent. That is, each element is 
simply judged as to whether it belongs to the goal set 
or not. No judgement is made or retained as to its 
similarity to the goal set or its adequacy as an 
intermediate step toward the goal. The power of the 
heuristic search formulation is that it makes use of 
information from previous generations and tests, and 
knowledge gained from other environments, in order to 
determine which element in the problem space to 
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generate and test next. 
To illustrate the distinction between the set-
predicate and heuristic search formulations, consider 
the problem of determining the combination of a safe 
(Newell & Simon, 1972 pp. 97-98). Given a safe with 10 
dials, each having 100 different settings, the problem 
space (E) would contain 10010 possible combinations. 
The generate-and-test method would require that each 
possible combination be generated and tested, thus 
placing an unrealistic time burden upon the problem 
solver (assuming each combination could be generated 
and tested in one second, it would take over 3 trillion 
years to try all possible combinations). If each dial, 
however, generated a faint click when its correct 
setting was selected, then it would not take a very 
sophisticated heuristic generator to "crack'' the safe. 
In fact, a problem solver using a heuristic search 
formulation would require, on average, only 500 
attempts to arrive at the correct combination. It 
should be noted, however, that unlike the generate-and-
test method, a heuristic search method does not 
guarantee a correct solution. For example, if the dial 
clicks were not indicative of the correct solution then 
the heuristic method described above might never 
generate the correct combination. 
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The basic cycle of the heuristic search method 
begins by selecting an element in the problem space. 
Next, the element is tested in order to determine 
whether it represents the solution. If not, the system 
may apply other operators to the current element which 
may suggest whether the element is a correct step 
towards the desired goal, and should thus be remembered 
for later use, or whether it should be rejected. The 
last cycle step is a three pronged decision of whether 
to apply other operators to the current element, 
advance the search by replacing the current element 
with a new element, or go back to an untried path. A 
heuristic search terminates"when a solution is found, 
resulting in reconstruction of the solution path, or 
the set of untried paths is exhausted. If the set of 
untried paths is exhausted then a new problem 
formulation must be created and a different method 
applied. For any one problem, there may exist several 
instances of heuristic search formulations each 
containing different sets of operators that could be 
applied to the problem space. For example, one may try 
meaningful number sequences to open the fore mentioned 
safe (e.g. birthdays, street addresses, or any other 
personally significant numbers). It should be clear 
that the heuristic search formulation and method, 
described above, represent a class of problem 
formulations that can be tailored to any particular 
problem, but it is not the only heuristic search 
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formulation possible. (e.g. Working-backward, working 
forward, means-ends, planning) 
Summary of Newell and simons' 
Human Problem Solving Theory 
Newell and Simon's (1972) theory of human problem 
solving was a largely successful attempt to specify a 
science of adaptive organisms. Adaptive organisms are 
adaptive because they are flexible enough to modify 
their internal processing and external behavior in 
order to fit a variety of task environments. 
Consequently, adaptive organisms may vary along any of 
several dimensions. Hence, Newell and Simon chose to 
restrict the scope of their study of aqaptive systems 
to a subset of human problem solving activities and 
described the scope of their study as follows (1972, 
pp. 3-4 & 790): 
The present study is concerned with the 
performance of intelligent adults in our own 
culture. The tasks discussed are short (half 
hour), moderately difficult problems of a 
symbolic nature. The three main tasks we use-
chess, symbolic logic, and algebra-like 
puzzles (called cryptarithmetic puzzles}-
typify this class of problems. The study is 
concerned with the integrated activities that 
constitute problem solving. It is not 
centrally concerned with perception, motor 
skill, or what are called personality 
variables. The study is concerned primarily 
with performance, only a little with learning, 
not at all with development, or differences 
related to age. Finally, it is concerned with 
integrated activities, hence de-emphasizes the 
details of processing on the time scale of 
elementary reactions (that is, half a second 
or less}. Similarly, long-term integrated 
activities extending over periods of days or 
years rece1ve no attention. 
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Even though Newell and S1mon based the1r theory on a 
rather restricted doma1n of study, the theory was, and 
remains, useful on a much broader scale. 
The theory addresses five fundamental assertions 
which are supported by evidence from the problem 
solving case studies discussed throughout the book. 
Newell and Simon's most fundamental assertion is that 
human problem solvers can be adequately represented as 
1nformation processing systems. In this view, all 
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adaptive systems (e.g. humans, monkeys, computers, 
cats, thermostats) are members of the IPS family and 
differ from one another only in respect to their memory 
organization, available elementary processes, and 
program organization. The theory put forth in the 
book, however, specifies an IPS in terms appropriate to 
the study of human behavior. Second, the IPS 
representation of a human problem solver can be carried 
to great detail with fidelity for any given person in 
any specific problem solving situation. This 
assumption implies that a complete and accurate theory 
of a particular problem solver in a particular 
environment can be constructed so that details as 
specific as memory retrieval processes, memory 
capacities, perceptual processes, and minute 
environmental details can be accounted for by using 
only symbolic information processing constructs. 
Third, substantial subject differences exist which are 
not simply parametric variations but involve 
differences of program structure, method, and content. 
Similarly, substantial task differences exist which are 
not simply parametric variations but also involve 
differences of structure and content. A theory must, 
however, contain some invariants and the two previous 
assertions indicate that there are only a few gross 
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characteristics of a human IPS which are invariant 
across subjects and tasks. The most notable invariants 
are the existence of symbol structures, a processor, 
eips, a short-term memory, a long-term memory, an 
external memory, goals, the serial nature of 
processing, and the rate at which eips operate (less 
than .5 seconds). Lastly, the largest determinant of a 
subject's behavior is the task environment which 
includes the intellectual and physical abilities of the 
problem solver. Thus, in Newell and Simons' view, the 
internal microstructure of a human IPS (e.g. 
operational details of sensory processes, perceptual 
processes, physiologic processes) are largely 
irrelevant to the study of human problem solving. They 
do acknowledge, however, that even though the 
microstructure of the IPS is not a central issue, a 
truly complete theory of human problem solving must 
also account for these processes. 
The general outline of Newell and Simon's theory 
of human problem solving begins with the assumption 
that human problem solvers can be adequately 
represented as information processing systems (IPS) 
which have a few, and only a few, gross characteristic 
that are invariant across tasks and subjects. The 
nature of the few invariant characteristics allows the 
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IPS to internally represent the task environment as a 
problem space and all problem solving takes place in 
that internal problem space. Furthermore, because the 
problem space is an internal representation of the task 
environment, the structure of the task environment 
determines the structure of the problem space. 
Likewise, the structure of the problem space 
determines, via the problem formulation, the possible 
programs that can be used in a specified task 
environment. The problem space invokes a problem 
formulation which in turn determines what methods 
(sequences of eips) can be utilized to solve the 
problem at hand. Lastly, the processing of an adaptive 
IPS can be adequately described by a program. 
We cannot know the structure of an individual's 
true problem space prior to their performance in a task 
environment. We can, however, hypothesize a reasonable 
program structure based upon the demands of the task 
environment. The behaviors which are predicted by this 
hypothetical problem space can then be modified in 
light of actual human behavior. The resulting program 
represents a theory of the actual internal problem 
space of the individual and can then be used to 
educate, enlighten, and improve human understanding and 
performance in a specified problem solving domain. 
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The Neural Network Perspective 
Neural Networks, as the term implies, are general 
purpose algorithms which possess operational properties 
that are analogous to the neural functioning of the 
human brain. That is not to say, however, that neural 
nets are wired, nor operate, exactly like the brain. 
Neural Nets are "neural" in so far as they are 
structured more like the brain than are traditional von 
Neumann computers. Advocates of neural computing claim 
to favor a brain-mind metaphor over the traditional 
computer-mind metaphor. Neural computers, however, are 
still computers and even the most zealous neural 
realist must therefore, see current neural models of 
cognition as neurally inspired rather than veridical 
models of neural processing. In a very real sense, 
neural realists are still using a computer-mind 
metaphor, but the computer portion of the metaphor has 
simply changed from a von Neumann computer to a fine-
grained massively parallel computer. Still, there are 
some very reasonable and very compelling neurological 
principles which speak for the development of cognitive 
models based upon a parallel distributed processing 
paradigm. According to Rumelhart and McClelland (1986, 
p. 130-136), some of the neural characteristics which 
provide the fundamental impetus for parallel 
distributed processing models are: 
The brain is composed of 10A10 to 10A11 
neurons. 
This is both a source of computing power 
and a constraint upon the possible models. 
Neurons are slow. 
Modern serial computers can operate in 
nanoseconds whereas, a neural cell operates in 
milliseconds or 10's of milliseconds. Neurons 
operate at 10 to the sixth times slower than 
do modern serial computers. Imagine slowing 
down modern AI software by a factor of 10A6. 
Much of human perceptual processing, intuitive 
reasoning and other processes occur in a few 
hundred milliseconds. This means that most of 
these processes must be accomplished in 
approximately 100 serial steps. 
Neurons are very simple processors. 
It seems unlikely that neurons compute 
functions that are much more complicated than 
a single digital computer instruction. Again, 
imagine trying to write an interesting program 
(e.g. one that recognizes visually displayed 
letters) with only 100 or even 1000 machine 
instructions. The mechanisms of mind are best 
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understood as resulting from the cooperative 
activity of a large number of relatively 
simple processing units operating in parallel. 
Neurons communicate by sending activation or 
inhibition through the synaptic connections. 
Neurons receive large number of inputs from 
other neurons and can send outputs to large 
numbers of other neurons. 
Each neuron can receive (fan-in) from 
1,000 to 100,000 signals and can likewise send 
(fan-out) 1,000 to 100,000 signals to other 
neurons. This means that even if every neuron 
is connected to only 1000 other neurons, each 
neuron is no more than four synapses away from 
any other neuron in the system. 
One or a small number of incoming action 
potentials is rarely enough to cause an 
individual neuron to output an action 
potential. 
This suggests that human computation does 
not 1nvolve the kind of log1c circuits out of 
which we make d1g1tal computers but, cognitive 
processing is the result of the cooperative 
action of many somewhat independent processing 
UnltS. 
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Graceful degradation 
There seems to be no single neuron whose 
loss contributes significantly to the overall 
performance of the brain. In fact, large 
numbers of neurons can be lost without 
appreciable differences in processing 
capabilities. Even in cases where there is 
sufficient damage to cause a performance 
deficient, there exists enough redundancy in 
the brain to allow the system to recover and 
achieve performance comparable to pre-injury 
performance. Such capacities are natural 
character1stics 1nherent in Neural Nets. 
Relaxation is the dominate role of 
computation. 
Computation in the brain is best 
understood as an iterative process in which 
the brain seeks to satisfy a large number of 
weak constraints. Neurons should not be 
thought of as wires in an logic circuit but 
should be seen as units which serve as 
constraints for one another. The brain is 
seen more as settling on a solution as opposed 
to calculating a solution. 
Learning involves modifying neural 
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connections. 
Knowledge is assumed NOT to be explicitly 
stored in given physical location, but is 
represented by the connect1ons among units. 
Therefore, the attainment of any new knowledge 
requires modification of the existing 
connections between units. 
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Three primary assumptions arise from these 
fundamental neurolog1cal characteristics. First, human 
cognition arises from the interaction of a large set of 
simple processing elements rather than the state of any 
single component of the system. Second, the simple 
processing elements function by mutually constraining 
one another and thus contribute in their own way to the 
overall performance of the system. The essential 
character of mental processes is thus viewed as a 
constraint satisfaction procedure where a very large 
number of constraints act simultaneously to produce a 
behavior rather than select a behavior from a pool of 
stored procedures. Lastly, all knowledge is stored in 
the connections between processing units. Only very 
short term storage can occur in the indiv1dual state of 
the processing elements and all long term storage is a 
result of the connections among the units. In other 
words, knowledge is implicit in the structure of the 
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processing system rather than explicitly stored in any 
particular processing element. 
These three fundamental assumptions intimate that 
there are two primary elements of any neural model; 
simple processing elements and the interconnections 
between the processing elements. Analogously to the 
human brain, neural computers have no central processor 
or central memory, but are instead composed of many, 
highly interconnected neurodes or nodes. Each neurode 
(or node) consists of a simple processor and a small 
amount of dedicated memory. Each neurode's memory 
holds an array of values which represent the strength 
of each incoming signal and an array of values which 
represent the relative importance (weight) of each 
incoming signal. Furthermore, like neurons, no neurode 
has access to the specific contents of any other 
neurode's memory and must communicate with one another 
by outputting signals which are indicative of their 
individual activation level. A neurode can therefore 
be characterized as a matrix operator which does no 
more than compute a weighted sum of the incoming 
signals and outputs a value based upon that we1ghted 
sum. Thus, the general behavior of any neurode can be 
described by the following equation: 
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where OJ is the output of neurode j. W1 is the 
relative importance (weight) of the signal being 
received from node i. S1 is the strength of the signal 
being received from node i. f is a nonlinear function 
which compares the weighted sum to a preset threshold 
and determines the actual output of the node based upon 
that comparison. 
For example, if a neural net was composed of three 
layers, and the first layer contained 25 neurodes, then 
each neurode on the second layer would receive one 
signal from each first layer neurode (25 signals) and 
store them in an array. Furthermore, each neurode on 
the second level would contain 25 connection strengths 
(one per incoming signal) in a second array. Each 
neurode would then multiply each value in the signal 
array by the appropriate value from the connection 
strength array. Next, the neurode would obtain a grand 
sum of the products of it's calculations. Lastly, the 
weighted sum would be passed through a function which 
compares the sum to some preset threshold and generates 
an output based upon that comparison. Each layer of 
the neural net would operate in parallel, thereby 
improving overall system performance by spreading the 
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huge number of calculations over many processors. 
After an input pattern is applied to the system, the 
neural net will generate the proper output based solely 
upon these simple calculations and the pattern of 
connections between neurodes. It should be made clear 
that a neural network does not execute a series of 
instructions as does a von Neumann machine, and 
information is not stored in a specific memory 
location. Instead, as it may be in the human neural 
system, knowledge is represented by the pattern of 
neural connectivity and the overall state of the system 
after it has settled into a temporary equilibrium 
condition. 
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish 
neural nets from the underlying hardware upon which 
they may actually operate. As stated in the 
introduction, one of the reasons for the resurgence in 
neural theories is due to recent of advances in 
computer technology namely, fine-grained, massively 
parallel or connectionist architectures (Hillis, 1986). 
Fine-grained massively-parallel architectures are 
computers that, like neural networks, have many small 
processors, each of which have a small dedicated array 
of memory. Most often, the processing elements 
(processors plus their memory arrays} of fine-grained 
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massively parallel machines are arranged in a two- or 
three-dimensional array so that each processor is 
connected to it's four surrounding neighbors (the so 
called North-South-East-West connection scheme). In 
some machines which use a three-dimensional array, the 
processors may also be connected to the processor 
immediately above and below them. Fine-grained 
massively parallel machines, however, are NOT neural 
networks. 
Neural networks are defined by the pattern of 
interconnection between neurodes, the rules that 
determine whether or not a neurode will fire (transfer 
function), and the rules governing changes in the 
relative importance of individual connections among 
processing elements (learning rules). Fine-grained 
massively parallel architectures provide a general 
purpose hardware platform upon which neural nets can 
operate efficiently, but the defining characteristics 
of a specific neural network are usually soft-coded. 
It would be impractical to rewire a fine-grained 
massively parallel computer every time one wished to 
change the interconnection scheme of a neural network. 
In most cases, it is the software (netware) which 
defines the neural network and the architecture of the 
neural net is independent of the underlying hardware 
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architecture. It is very possible to simulate neural 
networks on von Neumann machines or even with pencil 
and paper but, speed may become a serious limitation in 
both cases. For the purposes of this paper, neural 
net(works)s, neural computing, and parallel distributed 
processing (PDP) will refer to information processing 
models that are controlled by one or more general 
purpose algorithms which define the interconnection 
schemes between neurodes, the transfer function, and 
the learning rule that allows the system to learn, 
correctly classify, and properly respond to inputs 
without the benefit of predefined, explicitly coded, 
task knowledge. Furthermore, the present discussion 
will focus on the netware details and not the 
particulars of the hardware upon which the netware is 
implemented. This means that the algorithms described 
in this paper can be implemented on any system capable 
of handling matrices including fine-grained massively 
parallel machines, serial computers, and pencil and 
paper (although the latter two's appropriateness may be 
questioned on the basis of time constraints) . 
The Development of a Neural Network 
The development of a neural net can be 
characterized by four stages; engineering, training, 
testing, and operation. In the engineering stage of 
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development, the overall design of the neural network 
is determined. That is, the pattern of the 
connectedness among neurodes is defined, each neurode's 
set of connection weights are initialized, the transfer 
function is set, and a learning rule is selected. 
During the second phase of development, the neural 
network is trained with inputs which are representative 
of separate conceptual categories. Neural nets do not 
arrive at solutions by locating and executing an 
explicit set of task instructions, but are, instead, 
pre-programmed only with very general computational 
algorithms (transfer function & learning rule). Neural 
Nets must therefore, generate their own, internal set 
of transformations by learning through trial and error. 
The pre-programmed computational algorithms are general 
in that the same neural net which can classify pixel 
patterns as numerals could also learn to classify any 
concept (e.g. alphabetic characters) which could be 
represented in the same pixel grid. In order for the 
neural network to recognize the new patterns, the 
neural net would simply require additional training and 
neither the programming or design of the neural net 
would be changed. 
After a neural net is trained, it begins the 
testing stage. A neural net is most often tested with 
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the training patterns, as well as, new patterns to 
which it has never been exposed. One of the powers of 
neural nets is that they are capable of automatic 
generalization. That is, they do not need previous 
experience with a particular input or a huge memory of 
possible feature combinations in order to classify a 
particular input. Sequential pattern matching 
algorithms must often rely on explicit descriptions of 
the features and relationships between features in 
order to recognize a particular input. Neural nets 
operate by using the constraints inherent in the input 
and the connection weights, which are determined during 
training, to converge on a particular representation. 
If the input does not allow the system to converge on 
any of its known classes then the neural net will 
respond by creating a new class or responding "other". 
Lastly, if a neural net performs adequately during 
the testing phase it can be put into operation as a 
classifier, associative memory, or whatever task the 
system was designed to perform. In most cases, if the 
neural network does not perform adequately in the 
testing phase then it is simply given additional 
training. In some cases, however, the learning rules 
and/or transfer functions are altered and the system is 
completely retrained. 
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Two Representative Neural Networks 
Neural nets are distinguishable from one another 
upon the basis of three primary characteristics; the 
architecture of the interconnections among neurodes, 
the transfer function, and the learning rule. In this 
section, I will expand the discussion of these three 
defining aspects by describing the development of two 
representative and distinct neural nets; the Hopfield 
net and the Multi-layered perceptron. 
The Hopfield net is named for its creator, John 
Hopfield who has been instrumental in revitalizing 
neural net research during the 1980's (Hopfield 1982, 
1984, 1986). Hopfield (1982) is generally credited 
with correctly characterizing neural net behavior as a 
process of successive approximations in which the 
difference between the current system state and the 
desired system state is reduced. The technique is 
known as gradient descent and can be viewed as a type 
of "hill climbing" search heuristic. 
The now famous perceptron is one of the first 
systems ever designed which can be classified as a 
neural net (Rosenblatt, 1959; 1962). The early 
perceptrons consisted of a single layer of neurodes and 
were incapable of computing certain functions. Minsky 
and Papert (1969) wrote an elegant analysis of the 
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single-layered perceptron which exposed its 
computational weaknesses. The persuasiveness of the 
Minsky and Papert argument coupled with the early 
success of the serial symbolic processing approaches in 
artificial intelligence all but killed neural 
computing. The majority of Minsky and Papert's 
criticisms, however, applied only to the simple single-
layered perceptron models. Several researchers have 
now shown that the most severe enervations of the 
single-layered perceptron can be overcome by multi-
layered perceptrons (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986a; 
chapters 5,7,8). Furthermore, many of the neural nets 
being used today are modified versions of multi-layered 
perceptrons (Brown, Garber, & Venable, 1988; Caudill 
1988, Jones & Hoskins, 1987; Kinoshita & Palevsky). 
The task of both networks will be to correctly 
classify inputs which represent the numerals 0 through 
9. For the current task, the numerals 0 - 9 will be 
represented by 10 separate 3 x 5 pixel grids. Each 
grid will be divided into 3 columns by 5 rows of 
pixels. Furthermore, each pixel can have one of two 
values; 1 (ON) or 0 (OFF). Each of the 10 numerals can 
therefore be represented by a unique pattern of 
activated pixels within the 3 x 5 grid. Following the 
training, the neural nets will be tested with both the 
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training patterns and a set of novel patterns. The 
novel patterns will be degraded versions of the 
training patterns and will be generated by changing the 
value of three randomly chosen pixels in each training 
grid. (For a more detailed account of a multi-layered 
perceptron which recognizes alphabetic characters, see 
Brown, Garber, & Venable 1988). 
Phase I: Engineering 
The Multi-layered Perceptron. Multi-layered 
perceptrons are described as fully-connected feed-
forward networks which contain one or more layers of 
neurodes between the input layer and the output layer. 
In a fully-connected network, all the neurodes on one 
level are connected to all the neurodes on the next 
level. Neurodes on the same level, however, are not 
connected to one another. Feed-forward networks are 
simply networks which pass the output from one layer of 
neurodes to the next higher layer. In contrast, a 
feedback network would send the output of a layer 
"back" to the next lower level. Multi-layered 
perceptrons have one or more hidden layers of neurodes 
between the input and output neurode layers. It has 
been shown that a perceptron with two hidden layers can 
produce arbitrarily complex decision regions (Lippmann, 
1987) but, for purposes of simplicity, the network 
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described here will contain only three layers of nodes 
(an input layer, an output layer, and one hidden 
layer). There will be 15 neurodes on the input layer 
so that each neurode on the input layer corresponds to 
one of the pixels in the 3 x 5 pixel grid. The hidden 
layer will consist of 10 neurodes based upon a rule of 
thumb that the hidden layer should contain 2/3 as many 
neurodes as the input or output layer which ever is 
largest (Similar heuristics exist for several types of 
neural nets (Lippmann, 1987)). The third layer, will 
contain 11 neurodes, one for each numeral plus one 
neurode to signify "other"., 
After training is complete, the neurodes will 
function by computing a weighted sum of all their 
individual inputs and then passing that input through a 
nonlinear sigmoid transfer function. When a pattern is 
presented to the network, each neurode on the input 
layer will output either a 1 (fires) or a 0 (doesn't 
fire) depending upon whether or not its corresponding 
pixel is on or off. The hidden neurodes and output 
neurodes can be viewed as matrixes of connection 
strengths. For the current example, a particular node 
(k) on the hidden layer (j) would contain 15 weights 
(connection strengths), one weight for each input node. 
Initially, the weight matrixes for the output nodes and 
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the hidden nodes are seeded with small (<.1) random 
values. The node (Ok,J) then multiplies the output of a 
node (i) on the previous layer (j-1) by the weight 
(W1 k). Next, a bias term (B), which roughly determines 
• 
the size of steps taken toward the solution, is 
subtracted from the product of the weight (W1 k) and the 
• 
node (0 1 .J_ 1} output. The neurode then sums the results 
for the i (# of nodes on the previous layer) 
calculations. Lastly, the sums for each neurode are 
passed through a non-linear sigmoid function (f(x}=1/(1 
+ eA-x). In actual practice however, the sums are 
often passed through a series of conditionals which 
mimic the nonlinear sigmoid function. For example, 
.999, if X >= +5.0; 
.001, if X <= -5.0; 
f (x) = (x+5)/9, if +1.0 <= X < +5.0; 
(x+3)/9, if -5.0 < X <= -1. o; 
(x+2)/3, otherwise; 
Thus, the output of any node (k) on level (j) can be 
given by the equation: 
n 
= f(L.(WI k * OI.J-1) - B) 
I =1 , 
where ok,J is the output of node k on level j. 
the relative importance (weight) of the connection 
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between node k on level j and node i on level j-1. 
0 1 .J_ 1 is the value output by node i on level j-1. B is 
a predefined bias term. For the hidden layer, n=15, 
and for the output layer, n=10. For the hidden layer, 
the maximum value of k is 10, and for the output layer, 
the maximum value of k is 11. 
The hidden layer nodes send their values to the 
output layer. The output nodes then perform the 
identical calculations as the hidden nodes but, do not 
have anywhere to pass their values. Instead, only the 
neurode with the highest value fires and that neurode 
should signify the appropriate class for the given 
input. 
The Hopfield Net. The Hopfield net is a single 
layered network in which all neurodes are connected to 
all other neurodes. The minimum number of neurodes in 
a Hopfield network is equal to the number of classes 
divided by 0.15. For the current task, there are 10 
classes (the numerals 0-9) and 10/.15 = 66.67. The 
number of neurodes is always rounded up. Thus, the 
minimum number of neurodes needed by a Hopfield net to 
solve the current problem is 67. The Hopfield net can 
be viewed as a grid of fully-connected binary nodes 
which have a direct one-to-one correspondence to the 
pixels of the input pattern. In other words, the number 
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of pixels in the input patterns should equal the number 
of neurodes in the Hopfield net. This means that the 
resolution of the input patterns should be increased 
from 15 because we need at least 67 neurodes to 
recognize 10 classes. For this example, the number of 
nodes will be increased to 70 in order to make a 
uniform two-dimensional pixel grid. Each of the 10 
numeral classes will thus be represented in a 7 x 10 
pixel grid and the network will likewise consist of 70 
neurodes. 
Following training, the neurodes of the Hopfield 
net, like the perceptron, will compute a weighted sum 
of their incoming signals and then pass that weighted 
sum through a nonlinear tran'sfer function. The 
transfer function used with the Hopfield net, however, 
is usually a hard-limiting nonlinearity instead of a 
sigmoid nonlinearity. That is, the output of any 
neurode in the Hopfield net will be one of two values 
as opposed to the perceptron where output values can be 
continuous and graded. Also, unlike the perceptron, 
the Hopfield net is a single'-layered network and must 
therefore go through several iterations in order to 
settle on the proper output pattern. In this sense, 
the Hopfield net is a feed-back network, because the 
output of each neurode is sent back into the system as 
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input for the next iteration. Initially, each neurode 
in a Hopfield net corresponds to one of the pixels in 
the input pattern. Each neurode, therefore is either 
on (+1) or off (-1) depending upon the value of its 
corresponding pixel. The Hopfield net begins its 
processing by having each neurode inform all the other 
neurodes of its initial state. Next, each neurode 
computes a weighted sum of all the incoming signals and 
passes the weighted sum through the hard-limiting 
nonlinearity. The transfer function of the Hopfield net 
is given by the equation: 
n-1 
oJ<t+1> = f(~(w,, 1 * o,<t>)) 
1=0 
where 0 1 is the output of node j and t is the current 
iteration. w,, 1 is the weight given node i by node j. 
0 1 is the output of node i and n=70. 
The neurodes transmit the new value generated by 
the transfer function to all other neurodes and each 
neurode then computes a new output. The process 
continues to iterate until the network converges on a 
stable output pattern. The Hopfield net is said to 
have converged on a solution when any two contiguous 
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iterations generate the same output pattern. Upon 
convergence, the combined output of the neurodes should 
represent the pixel pattern of the input pattern's 
class exemplar. 
Phase II: Training 
Multi-Layered Perceptron. Perceptrons are 
referred to as adaptive neural nets because they adapt 
to inputs via learning rules. The most common learning 
rules (LMS, Delta, Generalized Delta, and Back 
Propagation) use a gradient search method in order to 
reduce the mean squared difference between the current 
overall output of the network and the desired output of 
the network. 
A multi-layered perceptron is trained by presenting 
a series of class exemplars to the net. The net then 
performs the fundamental computations described by the 
transfer equation. In the training phase, however, a 
supervisor monitors the output of the system and 
notifies the system of what the correct output should 
be. For example, if the input to our perceptron is a 
"3" then the fourth node on the output layer should be 
.999 and all the other nodes on the output layer should 
be close to .001. If the output of node three is not 
close to .999 and the output of all other nodes is not 
close to .001 then the supervisor indicates the proper 
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values to the network. The nodes on the output layer 
then calculate an error term based upon the mean 
squared difference between their actual and desired 
outputs. The nodes on the output layer then adjust the 
connection strengths (weights) which are held in their 
local memories and are representative of the 
connections between the output layer and the hidden 
layer. Using the same transfer functions described in 
the previous section, the nodes on the output layer 
calculate a new value based upon the new weights and 
propagate the new values back to the nodes on the 
hidden layer. The nodes on the hidden layer then 
calculate an error term based upon the difference 
between their actual output and the new values from the 
output layer. Based upon the error term, each node on 
the hidden layer adjusts the connection strength 
between the hidden layer and the input layer. (For a 
more mathematically detailed discussion of learning 
rules, see Caudill 1988; Jones & Hoskins, 1987; 
Lippmann, 1987; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) 
All these operations, from the fundamental 
computations through execution of the learning rule, 
represent one training iteration. A perceptron is 
usually given many (100+) exposures to class exemplars 
before it reaches an acceptable level of performance. 
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If the system never reaches a desired asymptote or 
reaches asymptote too slowly then features of the 
network may need to be changed. For example, the 
learning rule contains a bias term which determines the 
size of the steps taken when locating the minimum mean 
squared error. If the bias is too small, it may take 
too long to find the ideal set of weights or it may get 
caught in a local minimum during the search. 
Conversely, if the bias is too large, the weight vector 
may begin to jump around excessively as the system 
approaches the ideal minimum which will significantly 
slow the settling process. After the necessary 
"tweaking" has been performed and the system reaches an 
acceptable performance level with the training 
patterns, the weights are "frozen" and the system is 
ready to be tested with novel patterns. 
The Hopfield Net. Some types of neural nets, such 
as the Hopfield net require training periods but do not 
require supervision and do not learn adaptively. Neural 
Nets which are not capable of adaptive learning require 
fixed weights which are calculated during single 
exposures to class exemplars. Furthermore, they do not 
generate any output during training and therefore, do 
not receive any tutoring from an outside monitor. 
Static neural nets such as the Hopfield net are 
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trained using class exemplars (for the current example, 
the non-degraded numerals o - 9 which are represented 
in a 7 x 10 pixel grid). Each numeral is presented to 
the network once. After each numeral exemplar is 
presented, each neurode adjusts its matrix of 
connection weights based upon the pattern of inputs. 
The weights are adjusted via the following equation: 
n 
wl,J = ~cxl,s * xJ,s>, 
1=1 
i <> j 
where W1 ,J is the connection strength between node i and 
node j. X1 scan be +1 or -1 and represents the value 
I 
of the ith element of the exemplar for class s. 
Likewise, XJ,s is the jth element of the exemplar for 
class s. 
It should be pointed out that in this equation, 
elements and neurodes are functionally equivalent 
because each neurode corresponds to one and only one 
element/pixel of the exemplar. After all exemplars 
have been presented once, the system is ready to be 
tested with unknown inputs. 
Phases III and IV: Testing and Operation 
The Multi-layered Perceptron. Testing the mult1-
layered perceptron is a straight forward procedure in 
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which novel stimuli are presented to the system. In 
this case, the system will be tested with a mixed set 
of patterns consisting of the normal exemplar training 
patterns and exemplar patterns which were degraded by 
random noise. Testing patterns, h~wever, can be 
different versions of the exemplar pattern. For 
example, the training exemplar for the number 11 3 11 might 
be represented by turning on all three pixels of the 
top and bottom rows, the five pixels in the third 
column, and the pixel in the third row of the second 
column. Serifs can be added to the testing pattern for 
the numeral "3" by turning on the second and fourth 
pixels in the first column. From the neural net's 
perspective, classifying a variation of an exemplar is 
the same as classifying a degraded version of an 
exemplar. In any case, the testing patterns are simply 
presented to the system and the system responds, 
hopefully, by firing the correct output neurode. If 
the system passes the testing phase then it can be put 
into operation. If it does not perform satisfactorily, 
then it will be returned to the training phase where 
its performance can be optimized. 
The Hopfield Network. The testing and operation 
phases for the Hopfield net are one in the same because 
there is no way to "tweak" a Hopfield net. If the 
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system does not perform satisfactorily once its weights 
have been set then there is no other option but to 
generate a new set of training materials and completely 
retrain the system with the new set of exemplars. The 
actual steps in testing/operating a Hopfield net also 
differ from the multi-layered perceptron in terms of 
its output format. As with the perceptron, a set of 
materials is selected and presented to the network. 
The Hopfield net however, cannot fire an individual 
node which represents the proper category of the input. 
Instead, the pattern of all the neurodal outputs 
depicts the proper class exemplar. For example, the 
input might be a degraded 11 3 11 • The system would 
iterate until it had settled on pattern of activated 
neurodes which corresponded to the exemplar pattern for 
the numeral "3". 
The advantage to non-adaptive neural nets is that 
they require very few training trials, but they have 
several drawbacks. First, the number of patterns which 
can be recognized by such a net is limited and if that 
limit is surpassed the system will settle on novel 
spurious patterns different from all exemplar patterns. 
Second, the number of neurodes and calculations needed 
to recognize even a small number of classes can be 
quite large. For example, the Hopfield net can only 
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recognize a maximum of .15 times as many classes (C) as 
there are nodes (N) in the system (C = .15N or N = 
6.67C). In other words, a Hopfield net capable of 
recognizing all the letters of the alphabet (24 
classes) would require a minimum of 160 nodes and 
25,600 connection weights! Lastly, an exemplar pattern 
will be unstable if it shares too many pixels in common 
with another exemplar. For example, a degraded "8" may 
be classified as a 11 311 by the system unless certain 
orthogonalization procedures are followed which may 
further increase the number of neurodes, weights, and 
calculations needed to solve even relatively simple 
classification problems. 
Conclusion 
Neural net research began nearly forty years ago, 
but due to a lack of technology, sufficient 
mathematical techniques and the early successes of 
sequential symbolic processing efforts, the field 
remained virtually dormant until recently. Neural 
networks are neurally inspired models of processing 
which are based loosely upon known fundamental 
operating characteristics of the human brain. Like the 
human brain, neural networks consist of many highly 
interconnected, simple processing units which take a 
weighted sum of their inputs and transmit an output 
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based upon that sum. The result of neural net 
processing is not a particular value stored at a 
specific memory address but is, instead, represented by 
the overall state of the system after it has converged 
on some equilibrium condition. 
The development of a neural net involves the four 
stages of engineering, training, testing, and 
operation. Many different types of neural nets exist 
and the structure of a particular neural net is defined 
by three characteristics; 1) the pattern of 
interconnection between the processing elements, 2) the 
rules that determine whether or not a processing 
element will fire (transfer function), and 3) the rules 
governing changes in the relative importance of 
individual connections to a processing element's output 
(trainingjlearning rules). The multi-layered 
perceptron is a type of neural net which is 
characterized as a fully-connected, feed-forward 
network which requires supervised training. The 
Hopfield network, on the other, hand is a single 
layered, feed-back network which does not require 
supervision. Even though the multi-layered perceptron 
and the Hopfield net have very different structures and 
operating characteristics, they can solve equivalent 
types of problems by virtue of their highly parallel, 
104 
fine grained architectures. 
Neural networks are computing techniques which may 
provide solutions to problems that traditional computer 
systems have, thus far, failed to solve efficiently. 
Neural networks seem to solve problems that humans can 
solve easily, even unconsciously. Problems such as 
identifying an entity given only a partial or degraded 
description, recognizing faces, recognizing continuous 
speech and any other task which would be solved most 
effectively with an associative, content addressable 
memory. Neural nets do not work by executing a 
specific set of explicit, sequential steps. Instead, 
they are trained, learn, self-organize and settle on 
solutions. All of the problems mentioned above are 
important problems for the computing and psychological 
sciences, but do neural models have anything to say 
about the nature of higher level human problem solving 
capacities which have been competently portrayed by 
traditional serial information processing models? In 
the next chapter, I will discuss the relationship 
between neural nets and serial problem solving models, 
how neural nets can be built to solve higher level 
problems, and what the advent of neural nets may mean 
for the future of human problem solving research. 
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Problem Solving Neural Nets 
In the previous section I presented an overview of 
Neural Networks and described how two different types 
of neural nets could be employed to perform a 
classification task typical of the class of problems to 
which neural nets are most readily applied. In the 
remaining"chapters however, I wish to focus on the 
application of neural net models to higher level 
cognitive processes. To begin the discussion, and in 
order to lay some ground work, I will describe the 
correspondence between neural networks and schemata. 
(Most of this ground work is essentially a summary of 
Chapter 14 in McClelland and Rumelhart (1986).) 
Whereas the previous chapter drew strongly on the 
work of many applied researchers in order to provide 
concrete examples of neural network fundamentals, the 
work of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986a; 1986b) is a 
much more theoretical endeavor. Their general goal was 
to explicate how human cognitive processing can be 
characterized by coalitions of highly interconnected 
processing elements that operate in parallel. ,They did 
not attempt to specify one type of neural computer 
which could account for most human thought processes 
but instead described a class of computing 
architectures which they refer to as parallel 
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distributed processing {PDP) systems. In their two 
volumes, Rumelhart and McClelland {1986a; 1986b) 
describe a variety of human cognitive and behavioral 
phenomenon and then fit one or more PDP systems to a 
given phenomenon in order to demonstrate how PDP 
systems can account for the specified phenomenon. Some 
of the PDP systems which they describe have operating 
characteristics which resemble perceptrons, Hopfield 
nets, Hamming nets or other specific neural network 
architectures, but all the systems described by 
Rumelhart and McClelland have the features commonly 
associated with neural networks such as high inter-
connectivity between processing elements, no explicitly 
coded instructions, all knowledge available to the 
system is represented by the weights of the connections 
between processing elements, and a high degree of 
parallel operation of processing units. (Rumelhart & 
McClelland's use of the term "units" is equivalent to 
the concepts of neurodes, nodes, and processing 
elements.) 
It should be noted that in the PDP framework units 
can vary in their level of abstraction. That is, units 
can represent low-level features such as points, lines, 
arcs, pixels, and edges, or they can represent concepts 
as complex as voltage, words, phonemes, resistance, 
107 
furniture or any other concept relevant to performing 
the task at hand. Thus, the unit becomes Rumelhart and 
McClellands' theoretical primitive and the level of 
explanation at which any PDP model operates is defined 
by the degree of abstraction employed at the unit 
level. 
The construction of a problem solving PDP model 
begins by specifying a set of primitives sometimes 
called knowledge atoms. These primitives are 
essentially mapped onto the processing units and the 
weights between the units are set based upon the "real 
world" relationships among the knowledge atoms. For 
example, if one were to construct a PDP model capable 
of classifying rooms based upon the contents of the 
room, one might select "furnishings" as the level of 
the primitives (see Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, p. 
22-32, for a complete description of such a model). 
The unit representing "lounge chair" might give strong 
weight to the signal from the unit representing "couch" 
because lounge chairs and couches are often found in 
the same room (e.g., the living room). Thus, if a 
lounge chair is present the couch unit obtains a higher 
state of activation. Likewise, the units representing 
foot stool, fire-place, and television might also 
achieve a higher state of activation because they also 
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often co-occur with lounge chairs in living rooms. A 
unit representing "kitchen-sink" would have a high 
negative connection strength with the "lounge-chair" 
unit because a kitchen-sink rarely occurs in the same 
room as a lounge chair. Items such as carpet, windows, 
and drapes would probably have a positive connection 
strength with the "lounge chair" unit but, because they 
are likely to occur in several rooms (e.g. bedroom, 
den, family room, office) the connection strength would 
be weak. 
Essentially, each unit in a PDP model represents 
a hypothesis about the presence or absence of the 
concept to which the unit corresponds, and the 
connection strengths represent constraints among the 
hypotheses. The processing of a PDP system can 
therefore be characterized as a process of constraint 
satisfaction. Thus, if feature B (e.g. couch) is 
expected to be present when feature A (e.g. lounge-
chair) is present then there should be a positive 
connection between the unit representing the hypothesis 
that feature A is present and the unit representing the 
hypothesis that feature B is present. Likewise, if B 
never occurs with A then there should be a negative 
connection between units representing hypotheses about 
A and B. Furthermore, the strength of the connection 
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should reflect the degree to which the presence of A is 
a predictor of the presence of B. If B is very often, 
or very rarely, present when A is present, then the 
magnitude of the connection strength should be large. 
If the occurrence of A does not consistently predict 
the occurrence of B then the weight should have a small 
magnitude. Inputs to the system also provide 
constraints to the system. A positive input indicates 
that there is ev1dence from outside the system which 
supports the hypothesis that a particular unit is 
present and the value of the input signifies the 
strength of the evidence. Likewise, a high negative 
input provides strong evidence from outside the system 
that a particular unit is not present. 
If a system, designed in this way, was allowed to 
run then some units would gain enough evidence for 
their existence and would fire. After previously 
inactive units fire, the system possesses a new 
activation pattern which represents new evidence to the 
units as to the likelihood of their presence. This new 
evidence is equivalent to a new set of constraints and 
is reflected by the overall state of the system (i.e. 
the activation levels of all the units). On the next 
processing cycle, the new set of constraints would 
cause other units to fire, or not, which in turn 
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creates a new group of constraints with which the 
system must deal. Eventually, however, the system will 
settle or "relax" into a state which optimally 
satisfies as many of the constraints as possible with 
priority given to the strongest constraints. That is, 
the system will ultimately reach a point where the 
satisfaction of all impinging constraints cannot be 
improved, and, therefore, the activation pattern of the 
units no longer changes. 
In the human nervous system it is very unlikely 
that individual neurons account for abstract concepts 
such as couch or sofa. Nor do PDP theorists even 
remotely suggest such to be the case. In an ideal PDP 
environment, concepts such as sofas would be defined by 
other networks which use concepts such as padding, 
cushions, length, width, height, and upholstery as the 
level of abstraction. Likewise, these units would 
represent instantiations of sub-nets which define the 
elemental concepts (padding, cushions, etc), and so on, 
until some basic level of interpretation such as 
perceptual features (edges, points, etc.) is reached. 
Thus, when activated by input from the external world, 
the activation patterns of the units representing low-
level features will influence what is being interpreted 
at higher processing levels (bottom-up processing), and 
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the activation patterns at higher processing levels 
would, in turn, influence the activation patterns of 
the lower-level units (top-down processing). When the 
system finally relaxes (i.e. the constrains are 
optimally satisfied) an interpretation of the scene has 
been instantiated and is reflected by the overall 
pattern of activation across all the units. Therefore, 
a fundamental assumption inherent to PDP theory is that 
processing on any level is best characterized by 
coalitions of processing units whose microstructure is 
highly parallel, but whose collective actions may be 
viewed as sequential processes. 
While the specific operational details of the 
above processing scenario are somewhat new, the general 
data structure which emerges from this type of 
architecture has been bandied about by cognitive 
researchers for years and goes by many names (e.g. 
schema, scripts, and frames). The PDP group tends to 
use schema as the label for the data structure that 
emerges from constraint satisfaction networks. The 
concept of schema can be generally defined as a 
conceptual structure which represents generalized 
knowledge about objects, situations, and events. 
Schemata are sometimes difficult structures to 
implement because while they are generic 
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representations of the world, they must also have the 
capacity to represent specific instantiations of 
objects, situations, and events. 
One characteristic which allows schemata to 
represent both generic and specific information is that 
schemata contain variables (sometimes referred to as 
slots) . Schemata can be viewed as a group of 
characteristics that tend to co-occur with one another. 
If only partial information is available then a schema 
is capable of filling in the values of the empty slots 
based upon the values of the variables which have 
already been provided. 
A second important characteristic of schemata is 
that they can be embedded. That is, a schema, much 
like an idealized neural system, is a layered structure 
in which values in one schema are defined by sub-
schemata. For example, one may partially define a 
schema for a lounge chair by specifying slots such as 
padding, covering, and position-range with the values 
of 10 (high), leather, and upright-supine, 
respectively. The schema for lounge chair however does 
not exist in a vacuum, but resides in a structure which 
includes schematic representations for the more 
specific concepts of padding and covering. Likewise, 
the schema for lounge-chair may also be used by another 
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schema which defines a living room. In this case, the 
lounge chair would in effect become a slot in the 
living-room schema and would have the value of present. 
This would in turn activate all the slots of the lounge 
chair (padding, covering, etc.), which, in turn, would 
provide activation to the slots within the padding and 
covering schemas, and so on. 
This brings up the third important characteristic: 
schema represent knowledge at all levels. Whether a 
structure is a schema, a sub-schema, or a super-schema 
depends solely upon the viewer's perspective. If the 
perspective is set at the lounge chair then the living-
room is a super-schema and padding is a sub-schema. 
However, if the perspective is the living room then the 
lounge chair becomes a sub-schema and padding becomes a 
sub-sub-schema. There is nothing inherent in the 
structure of a schema that differentiates their general 
operating characteristics. In this sense, it is 
probably best to characterize schemata as a network 
rather than a hierarchy or tree structure. 
The last defining characteristic of a schema is 
that it should not be viewed as a static structure 
which is stored at some particular location. A schema 
is an act1ve structure wh1ch seeks to maximize the 
agreement between data input to the system and data 
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from previous experience which currently resides in the 
system as weights. In other words, schema are 
generative, self-organizing knowledge structures. Most 
symbolic implementations of schema (e.g. frames and 
scripts) are essentially static formalism which do not 
fully capture the generative, self-organizing nature of 
the theoretical schema. Neural networks do, however, 
provide the potential for implementing a generative, 
self-organizing data structure which captures many of 
the characteristics of the schema ideal. 
For illustrative purposes, consider the room 
classifier described in Rumelhart and McClelland (1986, 
Ch. 14). They asked subjects to imagine an office and 
then presented them with a list of 40 descriptors 
(desk-chair, ceiling, oven, telephone, drapes, etc) and 
asked whether each descriptor was accurate for an 
office. Using the same list of descriptors, they asked 
subjects to repeat the task when imagining a living 
room, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a bedroom. Each 
descriptor was represented by one unit in the network. 
The data obtained from the subjects' judgements were 
plugged into an equation that determined the weights 
for each unit based upon the probability of the 
presence of that unit predicting the presence of any 
other unit. For example, if the lounge-chair 
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descriptor was a highly, positive predictor of the 
couch descriptor then the unit representing the "couch" 
assigned a high positive value to the input from the 
"lounge-chair unit". Thus, if the "couch" unit 
received a strong positive value from the "lounge-
chair" unit, then the "couch" unit's activation level 
would increase. 
In the single-layered network described by 
Rumelhart and McClelland, each unit represented one of 
the 40 descriptors and each run began by "clamping-on" 
one of the descriptors (setting its activation value to 
1 and never letting it change). Thus, if the weights 
have been properly set, and oven was clamped on, then 
one would expect the system to settle on a pattern of 
activation that included refrigerator, coffee-pot, 
sink, stove, and toaster having a value of 1 and units 
representing the descriptors of sofa, bed, toilet, and 
desk of having a value of 0. In essence, the system 
settles on a pattern of activation that corresponds to 
a schematic representation of a kitchen. That is, the 
only units that will be activated will be the units 
that represent items commonly found in the kitchen. 
Likewise, if one clamps on bathtub, the system will 
settle on a activation pattern that represents a 
bathroom. In schema terminology, one could say that 
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given a certain input, the network is able to generate 
and fill in the slots of the room schema. 
It is important to realize that the ability of the 
system to settle on a given structure is in part 
determined by the definitional power of the clamped 
descriptor(s). Bathtub is a highly definitional 
descriptor of bathrooms, thus it has a high positive 
weighting for other bathroom descriptors and high 
negative weightings for non-bathroom descriptors. 
However, if one clamps on windows, for example, the 
system may settle on a less coherent set of active 
descriptors, because windows can occur in almost any 
room and will thus have moderate or low weights with 
nearly all other descriptors. Further, it should be 
made clear that schema are represented by the overall 
pattern of activation in a neural network and not in 
the state of any one unit. In a complete neural system 
the presence of any concept would be defined by the 
activation pattern of other networks of units. Thus, a 
complete neural system would consist of networks of 
networks much like a complete schematic representation 
would require networks of schemas. For the sake of 
simplifying the current case, however, the possible 
activation patterns of the descriptor networks have 
been collapsed and are represented by the units. 
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Although Rumelhart and McClelland used a single-
layered, fully-connected neural architecture to 
illustrate neural based schemas, it may also be 
possible to implement such a system on a multi-layered 
perceptron. In this case, the descriptors would be 
mapped onto the units of the input layer and the room 
types (or descriptors) would be mapped onto the output 
layer. The behavior of the network would not be as 
observable as in the case of the single-layered net 
because most of the processing would take place in the 
hidden layer(s) of nodes. Also, due to the processing 
characteristics of the hidden layers, one cannot easily 
pre-define the connection strengths between all layers. 
In the perceptron case, the network may use the data 
obtained from subjects as training and supervisory 
materials. Lastly, instead of a pattern of activated 
units being displayed when the system settles on a 
maxima, perhaps only one node, which represents the 
class/schema, might be activated on the output layer. 
While the multi-layer perceptron probably has less 
illustrative power for describing neural based schema, 
it remains an important processing model for many 
researchers. 
Synthesis: Integrating Neural Network and 
Traditional Problem Solving Perspectives 
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So far I have discussed how an important knowledge 
structure (schema) can emerge naturally from neural 
models and how neural networks can be used to classify 
information, create a "best fit" to the current data 
and data from past experience, are capable of 
spontaneous generalization, able to fill in missing 
data, and in general, characterize memory as a 
generative process rather than a selection process. 
While these are certainly important characteristics of 
neural systems and have a wide range of applicability 
in the study of cognition and memory processes, they 
provide little direct information about the nature of 
human problem solving. 
Human problem solving is a process that requires 
sequences of actions to be created in attempts to 
attain a desired goal. By its very definition, human 
problem solving has a prominent serial component, and 
serial models have already d'emonstrated their power for 
capturing the nature of human problem solving. If 
problem solving has an essential serial component and 
serial models have been successful in representing 
problem solving processes, then why should problem 
solving theorists concern themselves with neural 
models? 
The obvious answer is that even though serial 
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models are powerful tools, they are not perfect tools. 
As has already been described, serial models are not 
good at describing certain processes such as content-
addressable memories which are certainly utilized in, 
and are perhaps central to, the problem solving 
process. Both PDP and problem solving theorists agree 
that much of human problem solving involves the general 
process of generating adaptive sequences of elementary 
information processes. They also agree that elementary 
information processes are essentially parallel 
operations which take less than 250 ms to complete. 
Both camps further agree that the parallel and serial 
components must somehow be associated in order to 
influence one another's processing. Additionally, 
Newell and Simon recommend that elementary information 
processes should be defined on the basis of known 
mechanisms. Therefore, it seems very reasonable that 
elementary information processes should be defined in 
PDP terms. Consequently, any complete theory of human 
problem solving must contain parallel models of some 
processes. 
The second justif1cation for being concerned with 
problem solving neural models stems from the fact that 
the human mind does not operate on two different 
hardware platforms; one for high level rule-based 
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processing and a second for highly learned parallel 
processes. Most researchers in the brain and 
behavioral sciences view the human brain as a fine-
grained, massively parallel system and believe that all 
behavior results from highly parallel interactions of 
simple processing units (neurons) in the brain. We 
further assume that the parallel processes are not 
processing "packets" which are activated by some 
central, symbol-based executor. The high-level, 
symbol-based, problem solving processes somehow emerge 
from the same highly parallel human brain as do the 
elementary information processes. If we are concerned 
with increasing the parsimony of modern human problem 
solving theory then it is important to develop 
theoretical formalisms which can accurately account for 
both serial and parallel processes. We can no longer 
be satisfied with ignoring the importance of parallel 
processes by rationalizing that the essence of human 
problem solving is a high-level, symbol-driven, serial 
process and does not therefore require any parallel 
formalism to describe it. Therefore, a complete, 
modern, human problem solving theory should attempt to 
explicate how sequential, goal oriented, problem 
solving processes can emerge from a fine-grained, 
massively parallel system. 
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The last, and perhaps the most resilient, 
justification for problem solving theoreticians to 
concern themselves with neural models is that they 
represent a potential well-spring of new ways to 
conceptualize cognitive processes. Neural network 
architectures have several degrees of freedom which 
provide a great deal of flexibility in designing a 
given system. In addition to the Hopfield Net and the 
multi-layered perceptron which I summarized earlier, 
there are several other general types of networks and a 
variety of variations within each type. Therefore, the 
designer of a neural net has very few constraints on 
how she wants the neural net to operate. Because of 
this flexibility, neural nets can be designed to 
perform nearly any task that a serial model could 
perform. That is, they can be designed to solve 
problems which require serial solutions. 
A familiar cautionary note is necessary here, 
however. Like production systems, a danger exists in 
taking the PDP models too literally. For any one 
observable, psychological phenomenon, there exist many 
neural architectures that can reasonably model the 
process. Thus, one must be careful not to reason 
backwards. Simply because a neural net model exhibits 
behavior which is consistent with empirical 
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observations of people does not mean that the neural 
net is a valid model of human processing. In fact, 
most neural net solutions to applied problems will not 
represent the equivalent human cognitive process any 
better than a production system. Ironically, this 
apparent flaw in the neural network position is also 
the reason why we should pursue neural net solutions. 
The sheer number of possible ways to perform a given 
task using PDP techniques, plus the fact that so few of 
the possible neural models have yet been investigated, 
or even designed, indicates that the formalism might be 
rich enough to yield important insights to cognition, 
and consequently, how we understand the human problem 
solving process. In short, problem solving theorists 
should be concerned with developing problem solving 
neural nets because systematically investigating new, 
potential sources of insight is a fundamental task in 
any scientific field of inquiry. 
A Transitional Model of a Hybrid Problem 
Solving System that Integrates Neural 
and Symbolic Processes 
My fundamental theoretical position is that a 
general goal of modern human problem solving theory is 
to specify a highly parallel system which can produce 
ordered, goal-oriented, sequences of behaviors as 
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described by serial, symbolic models which have been 
derived from systematic observations of actual human 
problem solving activity. The goal of understanding 
serial processes as emergent properties of a highly 
parallel, distributed system, however, represents a new 
emphasis for the study of human problem solving, and 
complete understanding of the process is a long way 
off. In the meantime, it is important to develop 
applications and techniques which unite the symbolic 
and neural processing paradigms in order to maximize 
the strengths for both processing schemes while 
minimizing their respective shortcomings. Systems 
which use serial executors capable of calling massively 
parallel sub-systems are already available, and The 
America Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 
held its first workshop on integrating symbolic and 
neural systems,in 1990. Such transitional models seem 
to be a reasonable, and necessary, step on the road to 
building new theories, and in this section, I will 
sketch my own transitional model which integrates 
symbolic and neural processes. 
In accordance with the position taken in 
McClelland and Rumelhart (1986, Ch. 14), traditional 
schemes for representing problem solving processes, 
which have concentrated on representing relatively 
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long-lived (>250 ms), sequential, often conscious 
activities, still maintain their usefulness for 
describing higher level processes. However, the 
traditional formalisms do not capture the essence of 
the underlying fine-grained, passively parallel, 
microstructure of human mental activity. Neural models 
may provide new insights about human problem solving by 
demonstrating how many of the characteristics commonly 
associated with high level processes can emerge 
naturally from a highly parallel system. For example, 
neural networks have the potential of being more 
efficient pattern recognition systems, as compared to 
sequential models. If one understands problem solving 
to be the general process of dissolving large processes 
into pattern-matching sub-tasks (as both Newell & Simon 
and Rumelhart & McClelland do) then the natural way in 
which neural networks are able to perform pattern-
matching operations makes them potentially important 
theoretical constructs for the study of human problem 
solving. (I will expand this point in a later section.) 
Unfortunately, neural models use only weight 
matrices and general learning algorithms to describe 
the behavioral potential of a system. Thus, many, 
large matrices of data values must be sifted through in 
order for a human to derive a readily understood 
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description of the system's behavior. Furthermore, for 
a neural network to develop the capacity to perform any 
type of interesting problem solving task would require 
large amounts of effort to set the connection strengths 
either by training the system or by "seeding" the 
system with values obtained from statistical 
calculations. 
/ 
For example, if one were to build a checker 
playing neural network in a purely neural information 
processing environment, one would first present a game 
board to the system and allow the system to settle on a 
move. Next, an expert would have to provide feedback 
as to the propriety of the move, and allow the system 
to back-propagate this information. Finally this 
process would have to be repeated until the neural 
network had properly adjusted it's weight matrixes so 
that it would make the proper move given this 
particular board configuration. Furthermore, this 
process would need to be repeated for all possible 
board configurations. One-thousand training trials per 
pattern is not unusual and would make the endeavor 
impractical, if not impossible. One could imagine a 
similar scenario for a single-layered net. For 
example, one could present all possible board 
configurations to the network during training. Here 
again, however, system constraints would make this 
impractical. In fact, the time required just to 
calculate and construct all possible checker board 
configurations would be quite large. 
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Even if the training bottleneck was surmounted, 
the actual learning (changes in weight matrixes) and 
expertise (weight matrixes) utilized by the system 
would not be in a form that is readily understood by 
people. Knowledge-engineering, as inspired by the work 
of Newell and Simon, has well developed, relatively 
efficient techniques for deriving domain knowledge from 
experts. Furthermore, they are able to represent that 
knowledge in forms (production systems, frames, 
traditional programming languages, repertory grids) 
which are relatively easy to communicate to others and 
require no system training except for coding. 
Thus, my fundamental rationale for specifying a 
system which integrates neural and traditional 
knowledge engineering techniques can be summarized in 
six main points. First, traditional rule-bases are 
very effective at describing behavior and the 
conditions under which a behavior should occur. 
Second, it seems more natural to describe complex, 
sequential, human problem solving behavior with 
symbolic, serial models than with neural models which 
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use only weight matrices and general learning 
algorithms to describe the behavioral potential of a 
system. Third, modern knowledge engineers are already 
proficient in the use of symbolic representations for 
describing expertise and such a system would allow the 
use of neural processing without necessitating the 
retraining of the knowledge engineering work force. 
Fourth, using traditional formalisms means that 
currently installed rule-bases can be automatically 
converted to fine-grained, massively parallel platforms 
without requiring huge numbers of human-hours for the 
conversion. Fifth, the use of such a system would 
eliminate, or greatly reduce, the training bottleneck 
{i.e. setting the weights) required by most PDP 
systems. Lastly, I wish to determine what performance 
benefits and costs are realized when using neural 
models to process high-level, rule-based knowledge as 
compared to traditional, sequential processing 
architectures. 
As I stated earlier, my fundamental theoretical 
position is that the ultimate goal of modern human 
problem solving theory is to specify a highly parallel 
system which can produce ordered, goal oriented, 
sequences of behaviors as described by serial, symbolic 
models derived from studies of actual human problem 
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solving activity. Thus, there are three major reasons 
that traditional knowledge engineering techniques and 
symbolic formalisms are necessary for gathering and 
describing expertise in a given problem solving domain. 
First, traditional knowledge engineering techniques 
which result in some type of symbolic description 
(frames, productions, repertory grids) of the problem 
solving behavior have already been shown to be 
effective tools for gathering and summarizing 
knowledge. Second, the descriptions which result from 
traditional techniques can be used to generate a 
problem solving neural network. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, the symbolic formalism can be used to 
test whether the resulting neural system operates in 
accordance to the description of actual human behavior 
(i.e. provides a validity verification tool). 
Therefore, the hybrid system that I wish to outline 
should be able to use a traditional symbolic 
description of human problem solving behavior (frames, 
productions, repertory grids) as input, parse the 
formalism, determine the inputs, output, number of 
nodes, and calculate the weight matrixes for each node 
based upon the information contained within the 
formalism. 
The process would begin with a knowledge engineer 
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conducting observations and interviews, analyzing the 
resulting protocols and building a rule base that 
performs successfully. For the sake of simplicity, I 
will use the tic-tac-toe rule base in Figure 13 to 
represent the output of the knowledge acquisition 
phase. As one can see from the figure, the rule base 
is composed of rules which are statements of the form 
IF <conditions> THEN <actions>. The rule base would be 
processed by an interpreter capable of parsing the 
rules into units and organizing the resulting units 
into a network. For example the system might extract 
units such as player, opp(onent), two marks, on column, 
on row, on diagonal, intersection, side, corner, etc. 
After distilling the units from the representation, the 
system would construct a matrix which represented all 
possible connections between the units. Next, for some 
architectures, the system would calculate the weights 
for each unit based upon the relationship among units 
in the rule base (how often any two units co-occur in 
the rules). This would be accomplished by using a 
formula comparable to Rumelhart and McClelland's 
probability of co-occurrence formula mentioned 
previously. In other architectures (e.g. multi-layered 
perceptrons), the system would construct a training set 
with some supervisory information. 
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Unfortunately, rule bases are efficient 
representations of knowledge and, as such, may not 
concretely represent all the information necessary to 
construct a neural network. In the current case, the 
events of opp=forking pattern and player=forking 
pattern would have the same activation level because 
the unit pairs occur equally often in the rule base. 
Thus, in the case where both conditions are true, the 
system would not be able to decide whether to block the 
opponent or to complete its own forking pattern. One 
solution to this problem would be to employ some type 
of weighting rule based upon which term appears first 
in the rule base. A second option would be to allow 
the user to manually alter the weights. Doing this, 
however, reduces the interpreter to a "roughing in" 
role in which it provides a rough outline of the units, 
the relationships among them, and the general 
architecture of the system. A user may, for example, 
examine the units extracted by the interpreter from the 
rule base and decide that he wishes to use a different 
general architecture. He would then be able to specify 
that he wants a multi-layered perceptron with 3 layers, 
18 input nodes and 9 outputs. The system would then 
map the extracted units onto the system specified by 
the user. In essence, the system would be able to 
automate the neural network engineering process, but 
the human designer would retain the ability to 
customize any component of the resulting network. 
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Another, even more promising, knowledge 
engineering technique known as repertory grids (Boose, 
1986) may provide another avenue for uniting neural and 
symbolic formalisms. Repertory grids were first used 
by psychologists to determine personality traits and 
have been used recently by AI workers to automate the 
knowledge acquisition phase of expert systems 
construction. Essentially, the knowledge engineer with 
the aid of an expert would identify the relevant 
components of a knowledge domain. These components are 
then organized into all possible pair-wise combinations 
and given to the expert(s) who simply make judgements 
about each pair's degree of relatedness. The expert(s) 
responses are then fed into a processing package which 
converts the relatedness ratings into rules. If one 
re-labels the components of the knowledge domain as 
units and the relatedness ratings as connection 
strengths among units then the raw data from a 
repertory grid represents the fundamental information 
necessary to build a neural network. Further, if one 
takes the units and weights data from the repertory 
grid and couples it with some knowledge about neural 
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net designs, then one has a system capable of 
automatically generating single-layered neural networks 
directly from information provided by experts. In the 
case of multi-layered perceptron architectures, the 
system may be able to identify inputs and outputs, but 
the values of the hidden layers would be difficult to 
determine on an a priori basis. Even in this case, 
however, the system might be able to automate much of 
the process by converting the experts ratings to 
training materials and playing the role of a supervisor 
during training. 
A maJor added benefit of using a repertory grid to 
collect expert knowledge is that the system would be 
capable of simultaneously generating a rule base and 
neural network. The rule base could then be used by 
humans to better understand the neural processing, and 
could also be used to verify the workings of the neural 
network. Inversely, rather than having to sift through 
large volumes of weight matrices, one might be able to 
alter the neural processing by simply changing the rule 
base. In effect, the system would reason backwards 
from the rule change and identify the neural data that 
should be modified in order to implement the rule 
change. 
Obviously, implementing all the capacities of an 
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integrated knowledge processing system, as outlined 
above, would require considerable processing power. 
However, the benefits of having a system which can use 
symbolic input in order to build, train, and operate a 
neural network might also be sizeable. If a knowledge 
base is quite large, for example, neural systems may be 
able to instantiate solutions faster than a traditional 
rule base. Generally speaking, if a neural network has 
been properly trained then it will always move towards 
a best-fit solution and never away from it. This means 
it is possible for a neural network to get caught in a 
local maximum, but, in most cases, a neural net will 
take a very direct route to a solution. Traditional 
rule systems which frequently use sequential search 
processes, however, often must first exhaust processing 
branches that lead away from the solution before the 
proper branch comes to the top of the search queue. 
Neural nets, therefore, are theoretically faster than 
traditional rule processing. 
In conclusion, the potential advantages resulting 
from a system that integrates symbolic and neural 
process1ng include reducing the neural net training 
bottleneck, enhancing the understandability of a given 
neural system's processing, facilitating the debugging 
and modification of a neural net, allowing existing 
134 
rule bases to be ported to neural processing platforms, 
and making the advantages of neural processing 
available to expert systems developers without 
requiring extensive re-training of the knowledge 
engineering work force. In general, neural network and 
traditional symbolic processing models tend to 
complement, rather than compete with, one another. 
Consequently, a primary goal for the next generation of 
AI technology should be the complementary integration 
of symbolic and neural processes so that each model's 
strengths are maximized and its weaknesses minimized. 
Sequential Neural Processing, Consciousness, 
Mental Models, and Creativity 
As is pointed out in Chapter 14 of Rumelhart and 
McClelland, the "distributed" in parallel distributed 
processing refers to the serial processing component of 
a highly parallel processing system. Take for example, 
the act of recognizing a room. Light reflected from 
the contents of a room enters the eyes and activates 
certain patterns of photo-receptors in the back of the 
eye. This pattern of activation is sent through the 
optic nerve to the occipital lobe in the back of the 
brain. The patterns of activations are processed, and 
lines, edges, and basic forms are extracted. These 
basic forms are then interpreted to indicate the 
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presence of walls, windows, drapes, furnishings, etc. 
The pattern of recognized objects are then interpreted 
as an entire room and a combination of rooms might 
further be recognized as a particular house. Each one 
of the steps is a parallel process in that it 
simultaneously processes a large number of inputs and, 
based upon the constraints provided by that input and 
past experience, is able to relax to a stable state 
which represents the interpretation of the input. 
However, the room cannot be identified until the 
furniture is identified, and the furniture cannot be 
identified until certain basic forms are recognized, 
and so on. Thus, the system is a highly parallel 
system, but the parallel processing has to be 
distributed such that processes which provide 
constraints for other processes must be completed 
before the secondary processes can complete their 
processing. Hence, the distinction between parallel 
and serial processing becomes a matter of the time 
frame in which the system is observed. If one looks at 
the system over a short time frame (< 250 ms) then the 
processing is best described as highly parallel. If, 
however, the system is observed over longer time 
frames, then the parallel processes can be seen 
operating in sequence. Thus, PDP models possess an 
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inherent, serial component which operates at every 
processing level from low-level perceptual processes up 
to the highest level conscious processes. 
So far I have discussed how a neural system might 
be able to recognize inputs, but not how it can use 
that information to execute sequences of actions. From 
the PDP perspective cognitive processing can be 
summarized in the following way. An input pattern 
enters the system and the system relaxes to a state 
which optimally satisfies the constraints provided by 
the input and past experience. As was indicated in the 
discussion of schemata, the pattern of activation 
across units represents the interpretation of the 
input. Therefore, each network can represent only one 
interpretation at a time, and the system maintains its 
pattern of activation until the stimulus conditions 
change. Once new data enter the system, it begins 
again to relax to a new stable state. 
In the PDP view of cognition, the contents of 
consciousness are represented by activation patterns 
which result when a large subset of the mind's total 
number of processing units relaxes to a stable state. 
Therefore, thinking operates on a time scale which 
corresponds to sequences of large-scale, stable states 
(i.e., when networks of networks of networks best 
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satisfy all their impinging constraints). Thus, serial 
thought processes are viewed as sequences of stable 
states which emerge from the relaxation of large 
coalitions of parallel architected, constraint 
satisfaction networks. 
One of the supposed problems with such a system is 
that it requires new input for the interpretation to 
change. This is not as big a problem as one might 
first expect. First, the environment is rarely, if 
ever, static. Thus, new input is continually entering 
the system. Even here, however, the model may be 
unsatisfactory because people don't simply sit by and 
monitor the world. People affect change in the 
environment based upon their interpretations of the 
environment. To account for this in PDP models, the 
environmental chang~s initiated by an individual are 
simply fed back into the system in order to provide a 
new set of constraints for the system to deal with. 
Consider the general processing of a game playing 
neural system described by Rumelhart and McClelland. A 
game board is presented to the system. The system 
takes the position of the pieces as constraints and 
settles to a stable state which represents the system's 
move. The new position may provide input to a second, 
opposing, neural system which settles on a move and, in 
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turn, provides a new set of constraints to the first 
neural system. The system can thereby generate a 
sequence of appropriate moves and play an entire game 
against an opponent. Even in this scenario, however, 
the system is entirely reactive and, in effect, deals 
with each move in a conceptual vacuum that has no 
expectations of future moves. 
One of the things that human players are 
particularly good at is trying to "out-smart" or 
anticipate what the opposing player is going to do 
given a particular board configuration. That is, we 
are good at creating mental models of opposing players 
and the accuracy of the mental models is a large 
determinant of our ultimate success in a given problem 
solving domain. This can be accomplished with neural 
nets by connecting two neural systems together 
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 198Gb, p.40). The output of 
the primary neural network would be sent as input to 
the second, "modeling" neural net. The modeling net 
would in turn produce an output which represents a 
guess about what an opponent might do given the 
system's move. The output of the modeling network can 
then be fed back into the primary neural network to 
determine whether the result of a selected move is 
desirable. In this fashion, the neural system could 
look several moves ahead and even "mentally" play an 
entire game. 
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The role of mental models is, in fact, central to 
the PDP view of thinking and reasoning. Both PDP and 
traditional problem solving theorists assert that 
problem solving/reasoning proceeds by breaking a 
problem down into sub-tasks to which we already possess 
solutions. In effect we attempt to break problems down 
into pattern-matching operations at which we are very 
good and that require minimal processing resources. 
Rumelhart and McClelland further assert that we have 
three essential abilities which allow us to perform 
logical tasks; pattern matching, mental modeling, and 
manipulating our environment. Take as an example task, 
the process of multiplying two three-digit numbers 
(343, 822). Most of us do not have the multiplication 
tables over-learned up to 822 so we must solve the 
problem by breaking it down into smaller, more 
manageable sub-tasks. Thus, we may have already 
learned to represent the problem by putting one number 
over the top of the other. We can then "see" that 
below the right-most column we can write a 6. Next we 
have learned to multiply the second number in the top 
row by the right most bottom number, so we write an 8 
below the second column of numbers. We repeat this 
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cycle for each number and start a new row when we begin 
multiplying by a new number on the bottom row. For 
each cycle the sequence is the same. First, manipulate 
the environment so that you create a representation of 
the problem. Next, use the power of our perceptual 
system to efficiently process the representation. 
Last, modify the environment to represent the results 
of the pattern processing and continue processing. Fn 
effect, we have reduced the task to a series of more 
manageable pattern-matching operations. 
Many adults, however, do not require physically 
representing the problem in order to solve it. They 
can do it "in their heads" because of the human ability 
to internalize the representations we create (i.e. 
build a mental model). Thus, we no longer need to 
physically write down well-learned problems, but can 
simply imagine manipulating the representation. Of 
course this does not apply solely to mathematics, but 
the entire spectrum of human thought. In the PDP view, 
human rationality is possible because of our ability to 
internalize or mentally model external events so that 
we can imagine manipulating the representations in 
analogous ways to how we might actually deal with the 
referent in the external world (Shepard's work on 
mental rotation seems to support this view as well). 
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In essence, PDP theorists suggest that human 
rationality is achieved by utilizing models which are 
represented by the activation patterns of large 
coalitions of PDP-like networks. 
There are some interesting traits which emerge 
from such a system. First, once a model is 
internalized, it can be manipulated in several ways. 
Normal operations can, of course, be performed on the 
representation because those operations are part of the 
internal representation of the referent. By normal, I 
mean operations that are normally done to the referent 
in the external environment. However, the 
representation can be combined with other internal 
representations which, based upon some selection 
criteria, possess traits which compliment one another. 
Thus, new, never before experienced, representations 
can emerge, and new objects which correspond to that 
representation can be tested mentally, and/or created, 
and tested, in the external world. 
New representations seem to evolve slowly from 
combinations of existing representations rather than 
being created anew. The same seems true of invention. 
That is, inventions slowly evolve from combinations 
and/or modifications of existing devices. In fact, it 
seems reasonable that before an invention can be 
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constructed, an internal representation of the 
invention must first be created. Once the invention is 
built in the external world, observations can be made 
about its true behavior, and the data from the 
observations can be fed back into the system so that 
the invention's internal representation can be altered 
accordingly. Similarly, modifying the internal 
representation then allows one to perform similar 
alterations on the external referent, and the cycle 
continues until some satisfactory result is obtained. 
To further clarify this point, consider the 
general process of problem solving as outlined by 
Newell and Simon. For a problem to exist, a task 
environment and an appropriately motivated problem 
solving system must be present. The problem solv1ng 
system must also desire another state of affairs than 
the one in which it currently resides, and that state 
must NOT be attainable by any complete, immediately 
executable, series of actions. In order for the system 
to determine possible action sequences that could lead 
to the goal state, the problem solving system forms an 
internal representation of the problem (i.e. the 
problem space). Based upon the internal problem space, 
the system activates a problem formulation which, in 
turn, allows the for the generation of a problem 
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solving method. The problem solving method is a 
sequence of elementary information processes that will 
hopefully lead to solution of the problem. If the 
method doesn't lead to a successful conclusion then the 
method may be modified or replaced with another. If 
enough methods fail then the problem may be 
reformulated, and if enough problem formulations are 
unsuccessful, then the problem space may need to be 
altered. 
It is my opinion that problem spaces, 
formulations, methods and eips are all processes which 
naturally emerge from coalitions of PDP-like processes. 
The problem space is a large, pervasive data structure 
that seems to be "settled on" very quickly. Likewise, 
the problem formulation and methods can also be 
generated rather rapidly. In fact, people seem to be 
able to begin generating possible solutions to problems 
almost immediately upon being presented with a problem. 
Considering the large amounts of data that have to be 
utilized in representing and formulating a problem, it 
is difficult to imagine that this feat could be 
accomplished by anything other than parallel 
distributed processes. In true problem solving 
conditions, the first attempted methods will probably 
not lead to a solution and will require modifying a 
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method, generating a new method, reformulating the 
problem, or altering the problem space. Furthermore, 
it seems reasonable to expect that problem difficulty 
may be directly related to the degree and level 
(method, problem formulati9n, problem space) of 
adjustment necessary to solve the problem. 
To illustrate, consider Edison's invention of the 
electric light. It is my assertion that the invention 
of the electric light, as recounted in Freidel and 
Israel (1986), represents one of the highest foFms of 
creative problem solving, as well as, intermediate and 
basic forms of problem solving. In 1876, Thomas Edison 
became interested in creating a reliable, economical 
lighting system and visited William Wallace's electric 
dynamo factory. It is reported that during his visit, 
Edison exhibited child-like enthusiasm for what he saw 
there, and 10 days after' re~urning to his Menlo Park 
lab, he boldly announced that he had the solution to 
the electric, incandescent light. Unfortunately, his 
proclamation was quite premature. 
By this time in his career, Edison had already 
been granted an impressive number of patents, many of 
which were in the field of telegraphy. Furthermore, 
many of the telegraphy patents involved the use of 
feedback loops to resolve a variety of problems, and it 
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was the feedback loop that Edison believed would allow 
for the development of an efficient incandescent light. 
The problem with the incandescent light was that it had 
a very short life. An incandescent light operates by 
passing a current through a filament which heats to 
glowing. However, very few materials can heat to 
glowing without melting or oxidizing. The two most 
promising materials, carbon and platinum, were 
resilient to melting. Carbon, however, was initially 
rejected because of its tendency to flame at lower 
temperatures. Platinum, on the other hand, had the 
problem of continuing to heat up past its meltlng point 
once its temperature had been raised to the point of 
incandescence. 
Edison, quite reasonably, viewed the problem as 
one of current control and thus designed several 
feedback loops to circumvent the problem of over 
heating. The feedback loop regulated the temperature 
of the platinum filament by restricting the current 
when the filament reached a certain temperature. When 
the temperature of the filament returned to an 
acceptable level, the current would be allowed to flow 
freely into the filament. Thus, Edison reasoned, the 
temperature of the filament would remain within 
acceptable limits, and never overheat. 
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While this is very reasonable approach to the 
problem, it did not work satisfactorily because the 
platinum elements would still distort and fail after 
remaining at the point of incandescence for a short 
period. Edison, and his Menlo Park staff, took the 
next year and four months to develop a new 
understanding of the elements required to build an 
efficient, reliable, incandescent light. That is, the 
initial problem space was faulty, and they spent the 
next 16 months creating a new one. During that time 
Edison gathered the some of the best technology, minds, 
and technicians for the assault on the light bulb. 
They performed literally thousands of experiments 
utilizing different designs and materials in one of the 
more intense technology development efforts ever 
undertaken. Finally, in October 1879, the Menlo Park 
team had developed a new understanding of the 
requirements for the electric light, had dropped the 
current regulator from the design completely, and now 
understood how carbon, thread, coils, and a vacuum 
could be combined to form a reliable incandescent 
light. 
Let me try to characterize this inventive process 
by integrating PDP and traditional problem solving 
perspectives. When presented with the task environment 
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(the development state of the incandescent bulb, state 
of technology, available resources, etc.), Edison's 
cognitive machinery settled on a problem space that 
activated a problem formation (call it the feedback-
loop formulation) which had been successful in the 
past. In fact, if PDP models are reasonable 
descriptions of problem solving, then Edison may not 
have had much choice than to characterize the problem 
in terms other than the feedback-loop formulation. 
A problem formulation is activated based on the 
interactions of connection strengths, which had been 
determined through a lifetime of experience, and the 
new problem components (overheating elements, wires, 
electric current, etc.). The new inputs possessed 
similarities to the components that existed in the 
telegraphy problems that he had solved successfully. 
Thus, the correspondence between the new data and the 
existing cognitive structures would tend to activate 
the highly successful, reliable feedback-loop problem 
formulation. In essence, the components of the 
incandescent light problem were mapped onto the pre-
existing feed-back loop formulation. 
Remember that in PDP theory, one can view 
cognitive structures as networks of schemas and 
coalitions of schema networks. Thus, mapping the 
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components of the incandescent light problem onto the 
feedback-loop formulation is equivalent to 
instantiating the slots of an already existing schema 
to the components of the incandescent light problem. 
Thus, the values of the slots (processing units) have 
changed but the relationships among the slots remain 
the same. The process of taking new domain knowledge 
and mapping it onto a pre-existing knowledge structure 
is probably one of the most fundamental problem solving 
techniques, as well as, the primary process by which we 
can understand the world around us. Simply stated, 
understanding does not exist until new information has 
been reconciled with the old. Thus, the model I have 
described, so far, represents a process by which 
initial understanding is achieved by analogy, and 
suggests that we may have no other choice but to 
initially attempt to solve novel problems by a form of 
analogical reasoning. 
In PDP terms, the process operates as follows. 
The weightings between the components that comprise a 
problem space, or formulation, are established by a 
lifetime of experience. Thus, when new data enter the 
system, the system attempts to find a pattern of 
activation which maximally satisfies all the impending 
constraints. The new inputs represent only a minority 
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of the total number of impinging constraints and the 
majority of constraints are provided by the pre-
existing internal connections between cognitive 
elements. Thus, the system will most likely activate a 
problem formulation which corresponds to previously 
experienced and successful activity. Because new 
information must first be mapped onto existing 
knowledge structures, new insights can only be achieved 
by modifying old representations. If the new data have 
a high degree of concordance with the old so that the 
existing data structure allows for reliable and 
accurate predictions about the new data (or in PDP 
terms the old structure is a good model for the new 
information), then only slight modifications may be 
needed in order to understand the new information. If, 
however, the information processing system does not 
have a pre-existing data structure which adequately 
models the new problem, then several possible 
formulations (or problem spaces) may be activated. 
This results in a "fuzzy" understanding of the new data 
in which different components of the new data may 
correspond to components of several different internal 
representations. The existing structure which fits 
best may then be modified and refined until a suitable 
representation is obtained. 
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In order to modify an existing structure, one must 
over-ride the influence of previous experience by 
having frequent experiences with the new data and 
concentrating considerable attentive and conscious 
effort on the new and old data. In effect, the 
experience and conscious effort will eventually allow 
new connections to be formed between units which will 
ad~quately represent the new information. 
Sometimes, however, a problem does not lend 1tself 
to any known problem formation (known at least to the 
person attempting to solve the problem). In this case, 
applying a previously learned representation to the 
problem only leads to plausible but ultimately 
ineffectual solutions. Edison was the victim of this 
when he settled on a solution that involved a feed-back 
loop to regulate the current, and it required an effort 
of historically monumental proportions to over-ride 
this powerful problem representation. When no existing 
representation is sufficient, the solver must create a 
new representation that is more than just a mutation of 
another previously learned representation. One may 
need to break down several representations, gather new 
data, and combine all those bits and pieces into a new 
representation. This is a very difficult process 
because the old representations are already 
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established, or to use PDP terminology, the weights 
have already been set. Therefore, any time the new 
information is presented, the system settles on the 
old, strongly connected, representations and blocks the 
new, weakly connected, structure. Furthermore, before 
the new knowledge will be fully assimilated, other 
related knowledge structures may need adjustment in 
order to maintain their accuracy and reliability. 
Thus, creating a new representation and gaining new 
insights is an intense pervasive process that requires 
a great deal of mental energy in order to over-ride the 
automatic inclinations of our cognitive machinery. 
At some point in the process of modifying weights 
(learning), the connection strengths between relevant 
and irrelevant units will be about equal, and the 
system will have a very difficult time locating a 
stable constraint satisfying maxima. The point at 
which both relevant and irrelevant components receive 
comparable activation is probably experienced as 
confusion. The combination of a system unable to 
settle on a stable activation pattern and the 
substantial effort required to change weights may 
explain why learning new, difficult information (i.e., 
information for which no adequate internal 
representation exists) sometimes results in discomfort, 
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agitation, and frustration. 
In this view of invention, all of the Menlo Park 
efforts from roughly September 1878 to August 1879 were 
fundamentally directed at constructing a more accurate 
internal representation of tne components and 
relationships necessary to build an incandescent light. 
In order to fully appreciate the difficulty required to 
create and disseminate anything new, one must remember 
that the true problem does not exist in the external 
world but within the problem solver's representation of 
the problem. Therefore, before an invention can 
emerge, the internal representation of that invention 
must first be created. A prototype can then be created 
in the external world and observations made about its 
true behavior which, in turn, feed back in to the 
problem solving system and allows alteration of the 
internal representation. 
Likewise, altering the internal model allows one 
to determine what modifications to the external 
referent may be fruitful. If a manipulation seems to 
work on the internal representation, then one may 
similarly modify the external working model and observe 
the results. If the modifications suggested by the 
internal representation result in too many failures 
then perhaps the internal representation needs to be 
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discarded and a new representation formed (as Edison 
had to do). It therefore seems feasible to expect the 
evolution of an internal model to be mirrored in the 
evolution of an invention. 
Likewise, the evolution of a technology over 
generations may reflect the development of a culture's 
general technological understanding. New inventions 
result from new internal representations, and new 
representations evolve from a highly effortful process 
of modifying existing representations. The new 
inventions will therefore reflect the changes in the 
internal models, and it seems reasonable that 
inventions would appear to slowly evolve from 
combinations and modifications of existing technology. 
To be precise, however, inventions do not evolve from 
existing technology, but emerge from the ever-evolving 
mental models which represent the current understanding 
of existing technology. 
For example, lighting systems have been employed 
since the advent of fire. Over time, lighting systems 
changed from a center fire, to torches, to candles, to 
kerosene lanterns, to gas lights, arc lights, and to 
the modern electric light. Each of these advances in 
lighting represents a new understanding of how lighting 
could be achieved. Thus, before any new lighting 
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technology could have emerged, a new internal 
representation of the process of lighting had to be 
developed in the mind of the inventor(s). The new 
representations were built by modifying previously 
acquired representations in light of new information. 
The new inventions were built based upon this new 
representation and reflected the change in the internal 
representation: Next, once the new representation and 
corresponding invention are developed, the new 
representation has to be distributed to other personnel 
who build, install, maintain, and use the new lighting 
technology. In order for these other people to 
effectively interact with the new technology, they must 
also modify their internal models of lighting. 
Therefore, disseminating new representations across a 
culture requires substantial time and effort by the 
individuals of that culture, and the degree of change 
required by the new representation determines the 
speed, and ease, with which a new technology can be 
absorbed by a given culture. Thus, in general, new 
inventions, which provide a user/operator interface 
that reduces the degree of effort that the 
userjoperator has to expend in understanding the 
workings of the new technology, should be accepted more 
readily than comparable technology which does not 
attempt to reduce the learning curve of the 
user/operator. 
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As already described, modifying internal 
representations is an effortful process. Further, the 
amount of effort may be proportional to the level and 
degree of modification necessary to construct a new, 
appropriate representation, and may partially explain 
why most inventions evolve and gain acceptance slowly. 
However, it certainly seems easier to understand how 
the electric light works than it was to invent the 
electric light. If understanding, like invention, 
requires modification of the internal representation 
then why is it easier to understand the electric light 
than it was for Edison to invent it? If it is simply 
due to the newness of the information or the complexity 
of the solution then it should be just as difficult to 
understand someone else's new theory/representation as 
it is to create your own. This does not appear to be 
the case. It seems easier to understand someone else's 
ideas than to have created them myself. As an example, 
I readily understood most of Edison's work and the 
operation of the incandescent light. In fact, the 
electric light seems like a rather simple device. I 
doubt however, that I could have so easily created the 
electric light as I understood the writings about it. 
156 
Part of the answer surely lies in the fact that I 
do not exist in the same historical context as Edison. 
After Edison developed his light, the state of 
knowledge was forever changed. The people who taught 
science and technology to me had lived in a world where 
Edison's light had been around for some time. During 
the interim between Edison's work and my learning of 
his work, further clarifications, new works which built 
upon his, and simpler language had been developed to 
illustrate, explain, and demonstrate the concepts 
applied by Edison. My representation of electrical 
technology was therefore compatible with Edison's 
inventions because it had been partly shaped by 
Edison's inventions. Furthermore, devices such as 
dynamos, electric generators, efficient vacuum pumps, 
and high quality conductive materials are now common 
place. In Edison's times these devices were high-tech 
devices and the ultimate solution for electric lighting 
depended partly upon improvements made by the Menlo 
Park staff in these technologies. In other words, I 
simply do not have to, and perhaps never can, solve the 
same problem as Edison or his contemporaries. It is 
difficult to fully appreciate the difficulty of past 
advances without understanding what was not available 
to those pioneers. 
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Overcoming the subtle delusions caused by the 
current informational context is one of the greatest 
challenges facing those who wish to fully understand 
the significant developments of the past. That is, we 
most often have to view the past through the filter of 
current knowledge. We can, however, gain understanding 
about the past by making ourselves aware that certain 
pieces of information were not available, and, by 
looking at the form of a solution, we may be able to 
gain valuable insights about the problem representation 
and the method which generated the solution. 
Unfortunately, even when our knowledge of the context 
allows us to empathize with past problem solvers, our 
current representation of the contemporary world over-
rides our imagery of the past, because our 
representation of the past is still a part of our 
current knowledge state. Therefore, we are forced to 
view past advances through a subtle filter of current 
understanding, which impedes our ability to fully, and 
accurately, re-create the true problem spaces of past 
inventors, and we mistakenly over-simplify the nature 
of the true problem that had been solved. 
While the pitfalls of hindsight are partly 
responsible, the primary reason understanding is easier 
than creation, however, is most likely due to the fact 
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that I did not have to deal with as many details as 
Edison. As described earlier, identifying, and 
processing, the salient details of a problem are 
activities which require large amounts of time and 
effort in novel, or creative, problem solving. By 
definition,.the initial state of a creative problem is 
large, relatively unstructured, and contains many 
extraneous components. The essence,of problem solving 
is utilizing, or developing, a strategy which 
efficiently separates relevant from irrelevant problem 
elements. If a proven problem formulation (e.g., 
feedback-loop), which is an efficient means of 
distinguishing relevant details, fails on a large 
scale, then the problem solver is left with only weak 
methods to identify the relevant factors within the 
problem space (e.g., generate-and-test, do-it-and-see-
what-happens, if-carbon-based-then-try-it). This in 
fact seems to be the case with Edison's light. When 
his feedback-loop formulation failed, he involved the 
Menlo Park workers in an exhaustive series of materials 
tests in hopes of finding the right combination of 
materials to solve the oxidation and melting problems. 
(Edison's staff ran electric currents through materials 
as diverse as metals, coconut fiber, human hair, 
fishing line, and broom corn to name just a few.) 
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Once the problem has been solved and new 
representation for the problem emerges, however, there 
is no need to examine promising, but irrelevant, 
details. In fact, a successful formulation will ignore 
extraneous factors. Therefore, as I read of Edison's 
work, I concerned myself only with the most salient 
details. I simply will not have, and probably do not 
need, as detailed an understanding of all the problem 
components as Edison. Not having to attend to 
irrelevant details removes much of the processing 
burden from the student of an invention while it may 
have actually consumed much of the inventor's energy. 
Consequently, creating an invention differs 
qualitatively from understanding an invention much as 
discovering the Cumberland Gap differs from driving a 
car on the road which now runs through the pass. 
Although he probably didn't think in these terms, I 
believe Edison was referring to the severe processing 
burden imposed by weak methods, and the mechanics of 
constraint satisfaction processing in the human mind 
when he observed that, "There is no expedient to which 
a man will not resort in order to avoid the real labor 
of thinking." 
Much like the distinction between learning about 
and creating an invention, a similar question can be 
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asked of the distinction between creative and 
traditional problem solving. That is, if problem 
solving is really a matter of modifying and recombining 
old representations then what is the difference between 
traditional problem solving and creative problem 
solving? One of the possible distinctions between 
creative and traditional problem solving is the degree 
and manner in which a representation is modified. In 
the simplest case, problem solving is simply a matter 
of using a representation. Consider a second grader 
who is learning to multiply and applies the problem 
representation for 7x3= to 8x4=. The quantities of the 
problem change. However, if the problem representation 
is sound, then the operations should still be 
successful. There is very little change in this 
representation, but solving the problem still requires 
effort for the novice multiplier. 
At the other extreme may be the case of Edison, 
who had to reject a rich, reliable, and deceivingly 
promising representation, and create a new one by 
discovering new information, breaking apart pieces of 
old representations, and combining all the pieces to 
form a virtually unthought of representation for the 
physics, chemistry, and architecture of an incandescent 
electric lighting system. In the middle may lay the 
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cases where one makes moderately difficult 
modifications to an existing representation or applies 
an existing representation to a problem domain which it 
had never been applied. 
Problem difficulty may in large part be determined 
by the degree and level of modification necessary to 
resolve a given problem. Creativity, however, is not 
defined by the difficulty of the processing, but is 
defined by the rarity of the solution. In this view, 
traditional problem solving and creative problem 
solving may be operationally identical. That is, 
traditional problem solving usually requires 
modification of a method which is a relatively simple 
alteration process. However, if that modification 
results in signif1cant savings in time and/or effort 
required to accomplish a task and the solution is rare 
in the given cultural context then the act is said to 
be creative. The ability for the solver to generate a 
rare method may be indicative of the uniqueness of that 
individual's problem space. If the internal 
representation is unique, then, for the solver, the 
problem was relatively easy to solve. However, 
someone, who did not begin with a problem space that 
allowed for such a unique modification, would have to 
exert much effort to construct an internal problem 
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space that would facilitate a culturally rare solution. 
Conversely, it is possible for someone to exert mammoth 
efforts to construct a new understanding of a problem, 
but the ultimate solution may not be judged creative. 
For example, present a modern automobile to an 
individual, who has minimal auto maintenance 
experience. Furthermore, inform him that the car is 
"running rough" and it is his job to fix it. The naive 
mechanic may have to completely reformulate the problem 
of automobile maintenance in order to understand the 
nature of the malfunction and its remedy. That is, 
from the novice's perspective, the problem space is 
relatively large, unstructured, and few formulations 
exist for traversing the problem space. Thus, from the 
perspective of the novice's internal processing, 
learning to repair a car is an effortful, creative act, 
but from the perspective of our culture, it is not rare 
and is not, therefore, creative. 
Whether we judge the final product of processing 
as creative depends upon the product's rarity within 
its cultural context. In general, the highest forms of 
creativity will correspond to internal processing that 
requires disassembly of several internal 
representations, gathering of new information and 
assimilating all the information into a new internal 
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representation which generates some product of value to 
the solver or society. In many cases, however, a 
person may have to undertake this highly effortful 
process to solve a traditional problem. Likewise, 
there may be cases where a relatively simple 
modification results in a rare, creative solution. 
Therefore, while there is a degree of correspondence 
between creativity and problem difficulty, as 
determined by the magnitude and level of modification 
required by the internal representations, the 
correspondence is not perfect. 
Problem difficulty and creativity both involve 
modifying internal representations which are reflected 
in the activation patterns of large coalitions of 
neural networks. Neural networks are, in turn, 
composed of large coalitions of processing units (i. e. 
neurodes) and the data structure which emerges from 
this architecture can be described as a network of 
generative schema. Furthermore, it is my assertion 
that the judgement of creativity is based upon a 
cultural context and not upon the nature of the 
underlying processing. Therefore, the internal 
processes utilized in a large segment of creative 
problem solving is operationally equivalent to 
traditional problem solving processes in that both 
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utilize processes that modify pre-existing internal 
representations. A creative act, however, results when 
these same processes act to form a culturally unique 
problem representation that is effective at resolving a 
given problem. It therefore seems reasonable that an 
appropriate manner to study creativity is to uncover 
operations (heuristics) which might lead to unique 
problem representations. Interestingly, alterations 
which emerge naturally from the processing of 
constraint satisfaction networks generate heuristic-
like modifications of existing schema/internal 
representations. 
In the conceptual framework discussed so far, the 
task environment consists of everything available to 
the subject in the external environment plus the 
cognitive potential of the problem solving system as 
represented by all the connection strengths in the 
system. When the system is placed in a problem solving 
situation, the task environment activates a problem 
space which is represented by a pattern of activation 
across a large coalition of networks. 
Likewise, the activation pattern of the problem 
space, via the inputs from the external world and the 
internal connection strengths, activate a problem 
formulation. The problem formulation, subsequently 
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activates a method which, in turn, activates a series 
of eips. It should be made clear that even though only 
one problem representation, formulation, and method may 
fire, several may receive partial activation that does 
not meet the activation threshold. In a normal, 
relatively well learned, problem solving domain the 
system is able to settle on successful patterns 
quickly. That is, the external input is consistent 
enough with stored connection strengths, that the 
system can quickly settle on the appropriate pattern of 
activation and generate the corresponding behaviors. 
However, if the external problem constraints and the 
internal representations do not "fit" one another well 
enough to activate a known representation (i.e. a 
tightly bound coalition of networks and units), then 
the system settles on a spurious pattern of activation. 
For example, Rumelhart and McClelland clamped on 
two descriptors, sofa and bed, which were strongly-
predictive, but mutually contradictory, descriptors for 
the living room and bedroom, respectively. When both 
predictors were clamped-on, the resulting pattern of 
activation did not represent a normal living room or 
bedroom. Instead the pattern of activation defined 
what could be called a luxurious bedroom which was 
large, contained a bed, a lounge chair, a dresser, a 
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fireplace, and a sofa. The spurious patterns that can 
result, when strongly-predictive, contradictory 
constraints are activated, may take several forms which 
correspond, at least roughly, to some of the 
combinatorial possibilities outlined by Weber & Perkins 
(1989). The spurious patterns are important because 
they provide clues as to how the internal 
representation might be modified in order to resolve a 
given problem or create a new artifact. 
In the simplest case, the system activates a 
series of behaviors which do not successfully 
accomplish the goal. The system then receives 
information that notifies it of the failure and the 
system begins to search for a better representation. 
Parts of the representation and corresponding 
behaviors, may be judged as faulty based upon the 
external data and data from previous experience. The 
components which are deemed faulty are inhibited which 
results in a new pattern of system constraints. The 
system tries to relax to a new stable state which may 
result in simple omission of certain methods, in 
replacement of some methods, and/or reorganization of 
the methods. 
In more complex cases, however, previous 
experience and external data cannot combine to generate 
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a well defined, stable state. In this case, as in the 
Rumelhart and McClelland case, the system forms, after 
some substantial jumping around, a new coalition that 
is the raw data for one class of creative thought. In 
effect, no one representation, formulation, or method 
are fully instantiated. Therefore, only portions of 
several representations are activated. In one case, 
the spurious activation pattern may take the form of an 
ANDing operation in which two independent schemas are 
activated as one, or where only a few components of one 
representation are activated in unison with another, 
complete, schema. It is important to realize that 
while this process activates certain related 
components, it may also eliminate under-supported 
components and result in operations that are equivalent 
to ORing and XORing. 
The spurious pattern that results from this 
natural activity of constraint satisfaction networks is 
the raw data that may be used in the next, and perhaps 
most laborious, problem solving process. In most truly 
novel problem solving situations, the patterns of 
activation, which emerge from this process, will not be 
wholly complete or accurate. That is, some of the 
activated components will be unnecessary and even 
contradictory while other necessary patterns will not 
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reach threshold and will not, therefore, be part of the 
overall pattern of activation. The problem solving 
system must therefore engage in a process whereby it 
builds up connection strengths between relevant 
components and eliminates connections between 
undesirable, components. 
The process is a two pronged process involving 
conscious effort and experience. The connection 
strengths are accumulated through experience with the 
components and the relationships among the components. 
As components tend to co-occur with one another, the 
units which represent hypotheses about their presence 
become more tightly connected. Thus, experience with 
the components, in the form of repeated exposures to 
the units, is necessary for the proper connections to 
be built. 
Simple repetition and rehe~rsal, however, are 
probably not enough to account for the ability to form 
new representations. Due to the system's tendency to 
settle on a previously stored pattern of activation, 
simply exposing the system to the factors would 
probably require huge numbers of exposures, during many 
different states of activation, in order for the new 
information to be completely assimilated. 
Instead of presenting the system with massive 
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numbers of external exposures, humans are able to make 
multiple presentations of the factors by "imagining" 
the components in concert with other information. This 
conscious, effortful, activity allows for efficient 
multiple exposures to the system, so that weights can 
be changed more quickly than with the brute force 
required of multiple external exposures. It is also 
possible that consciousness allows for the adjustment 
of weights by activating, or in some way involving, a 
chemical "broadcast" process in the human brain which 
inhibits previously stored weights and facilitates 
construction of new connections across the system. 
Lastly, non-conscious attention probably plays a 
large role in resetting connections by allowing the 
system to operate on other problems while continuing to 
propagate the new data throughout the system. Such 
processing may account for insights that purportedly 
come after a period of incubation. 
If creative problem solving proceeds by refining 
spurious patterns of activation then insight may have 
several flavors. One type of insight may result when a 
spurious pattern of activation is activated and new 
combinations are therefore available to the system for 
further processing. A second form of insight may be 
experienced when the system gains enough experience 
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with a collection of phenomena that a new, stable, 
pattern of activation emerges. The third flavor of 
insight may result when a pattern of activation is 
edited such that it behaves consistently with all, or 
at least most, related representations (i. e. the 
representation has been fully assimilated). 
Summary and Conclusions 
My intent in the previous section was to outline 
the possible correspondence between neural and 
traditional problem solving models. My position is 
that both views have much to offer one another and are, 
in fact, much more complimentary perspectives than they 
are adversarial. The two theories mesh nicely in their 
level of explanation and can be combined to form rich, 
integrated, processing models that can be applied to 
real world information processing problems. I have 
also tried to describe how common, and creative, 
problem solving processes may emerge naturally from an 
underlying constraint satisfaction processing model. 
It has not been my intent to provide proof for the 
existence of such processes because such proofs may 
require career-long efforts. Instead, my goal has been 
to suggest reasonable processes which allow the reader 
to envision the varied, potentially important, insights 
that neural models can contribute to the study of human 
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problem solving and creativity. 
When I first became interested in the two general 
fields of neural networks and human problem solving, 
there seemed to be a battle raging in the cognitive 
sciences about the rightful places of traditional 
sequential and the newer neurally-inspired information 
processing models. Upon reading and studying two of 
the landmark works in both fields, I have come to the 
conclusion that the theories of the four predominate 
theorists (Newell & Simon and Rumelhart & McClelland) 
have relatively few points of dispute. In fact, there 
seems to be a great concordance between the paradigms 
with respect to their relative positions in the 
theoretical landscape, and their perspectives on the 
nature of human problem solving. 
First, it should be pointed out that the Newell 
and Simon theory is mainly concerned with describing 
behavior in order to deduce precise, abstract models 
(production systems/programs) of underlying human 
knowledge structures. It was their view that the 
programs which resulted from such investigations would 
accurately predict human behavior, but that the program 
itself should not be viewed as a specification of the 
actual processing mechanisms. Newell and Simon took 
great care in divorcing their theory of human behavior 
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from any detailed description of underlying 
physiological and computational processes, and in fact, 
acknowledged that much of the actual underlying 
mechanism of human behavior was most likely parallel. 
The Newell and Simon theory is concerned mainly 
with describing the outward behavior of humans in 
problem solving situations and inferring from that 
behavior a precise, accurate, parsimonious model of the 
individual's internal problem representation. Their 
theory is related to machinery only in that the 
computer metaphor provided them with a theoretical tool 
capable of the descriptive and predictive precision 
which they sought. 
The serial von Neumann computer provided them with 
the proper degree of precision because they viewed the 
essence of human problem solving to be a highly-
integrated, sequential process (a point with which most 
PDP theorists agree). The serial computer metaphor 
provided them with a flexible, powerful, "perfectly 
rational" problem solver to which human behavior could 
be compared and thereby provide a greater understanding 
of human rationality. Newell and Simon contend that a 
major goal of the study of human problem solving is not 
only to create machines which can mimic the problem 
solving proficiency of humans, but to describe and 
explain human problem solving performance with such 
precision as to be capable of disseminating the 
knowledge in a useful way to other humans; be they 
expert, novice, or theoretician. 
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The PDP theorists, on the other hand, are more 
concerned with specifying low-level cognitive 
mechanisms that are computationally powerful enough to 
produce the entirety of human behavior. Neural models 
have gained momentum in recent years due to three 
occurrences. First, connectionist computer 
architectures have become available which make highly-
parallel computing processes practical. Second, 
traditional serial architectures have proven too 
cumbersome, even at high processing rates, to 
efficiently solve "monster" AI problems such as 
content-addressable memory, speech recognition, scene 
interpretation, and any other process that requires 
pattern-matching processes that contain large 
quantities of data points. Lastly, learning-algorithms 
and transfer functions have been developed which 
overcome weaknesses of the earlier neural networks. 
Neurally inspired computing models overcome the 
weaknesses of serial processes by taking a different 
approach to data processing. In serial computing, the 
amount of time required to identify a pattern increases 
174 
with the number of data points to be interpreted. On 
the other hand, human beings, the most advanced PDP 
system we know about, seem to be able to produce 
solutions more quickly when given more information. 
Humans are able to make better use of context effects 
whereas serial computers must process each element in a 
virtual vacuum, thereby, increasing the time required 
to process all relevant information. Neural nets, 
analogously to humans, are able to make more effective 
use of the multiple constraints provided by the context 
instead of being burdened by them as are serial 
machines. 
PDP, or neural network, models are inspired by the 
architecture of the brain. First, they have no central 
processor, but are composed of a large number of 
highly-interconnected simple processors which interact 
and constrain one another in ways determined by the 
relative connection strengths that exist between them. 
Secondly, neural networks are not programmed but are 
trained. Thus, the essential character of processing 
is a constraint satisfaction procedure in which a very 
large number of constraints acts to produce behavior 
rather than select a behavior from a predefined pool of 
possible procedures. Lastly, no knowledge is 
explicitly coded in the system, but instead, exists 
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within the connection strengths between the processing 
elements. 
According to their books, Rumelhart & McClelland 
and Newell & Simon, agree on nearly all major topics 
concerning human problem solving. Both agree that a 
large portion of human cognition has a sequential 
nature and that much of human problem solving behavior 
can be captured in serial models. Further, they agree 
that human problem solving proceeds by dissolving the 
problems into sub-tasks for which the solver already 
possesses solutions. This is tantamount to saying that 
problem solving proceeds by reducing the problem into 
pattern matching tasks which are probably highly 
parallel operations (Newell and Simon refer to these 
processes as elementary information processes). Thus, 
the serial nature of problem solving results from 
executing sequences of these elementary, parallel 
processes as directed by a successful problem solving 
strategy. 
The two camps also agree that if a process takes 
less than half a second then it is probably parallel, 
and if it takes more than 500 ms then it probably has a 
serial nature. Of course there is a gray area (250 ms 
to 500 ms) in which both camps claim some dominance and 
it seems l1kely that some sequences of operations can 
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take place in less than 500 msec while some parallel 
processes may require longer than 250 ms to settle on a 
solution. They agree on the fact that the contents of 
consciousnessfSTM are probably the result of processes 
done in parallel (content addressable memory retrieval 
v. settling of large networks to a maxima). The two 
camps even agree to a large degree on their respective 
places in the theoretical landscape and is captured 
nicely by Rumelhart and McClelland. In essence, it is 
their view that at the low-end of cognitive processing 
there is a relatively high degree of understanding. 
That is, we tend to have relatively good models for low 
level processes such as color recognition, edge 
detectors and the like. Likewise, we also have a 
rather good understanding of the highest level, most 
conscious processes, because if we didn't, we would not 
be able to communicate with one another. In the middle 
between these two end points, however, there exists a 
sizeable hole in our understanding. Serial theorists 
attempt to illuminate this chasm by climbing DOWN into 
this pit with their methodological flashlights. PDP 
theorists attempt to climb UP into the breach with 
their methodological flashlights in hand. The hope is 
that the two will eventually meet someplace where their 
combined lights will illuminate the entirety, or at 
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least most, of the gulf that exists in our current 
understanding of human cognition. It is my hope that 
the current paper has provided some power to both 
theoretical lanterns and thereby helped to reduce the 
gulf that exists between the two paradigms' respective 
areas of illumination. 
People are confronted with a problem when they 
desire a goal and do not posses an immediately 
available method to obtain the goal. The problem 
solver must therefore formulate a strategy to obtain 
the goal. Formulating the strategy involves dissolving 
the problem into its components and performing a 
sequence of elementary processes upon those components 
which result in attainment of the goal. Each 
elementary processes is readily accessible to the 
solver, takes less than 500 ms to complete, is probably 
a pattern-matching process, and is most likely a highly 
parallel process, or a tightly-bound sequence of 
parallel processes. If the problem formulation is 
correct, and the solver is given enough time to 
complete the strategy, then the desired goal will be 
obtained. 
On the surface, it seems a straight-forward 
operation to combine these two processing models into 
one complete system. First, one needs only to specify 
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a serial executor which is capable of formulating a 
strategy and planning a sequence of actions. Second, 
couple the executor with a PDP architected memory and 
procedures and let the system run. Of course there are 
many technical issues that would have to be addressed 
before such a system were operational, but the general 
concept is sound. In fact, many firms are now looking 
to create such hybrid systems. Specifying applied 
systems which use both serial and neural processes is 
important for applied researchers, but may also prov1de 
a transitional model for cognitive theories. 
Eventually, however, our theoretical models will mostly 
describe serial processes in terms of parallel 
processes. 
I am not advocating discarding concepts such as 
problem space, heuristics, and internal 
representations. Nor am I denying the fact that the 
fundamental nature of human problem solving appears to 
sequential. Quite the contrary, these are important 
concepts and should be integrated with PDP models to 
develop a cohesive model which encompasses both the 
parallel microstructure and serial macrostructure of 
human problem solving. 
In fact, I believe that PDP models would be 
completely insufficient models of human problem solving 
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and the study of human problem solving would come to a 
halt if the only methodological tools available were 
the currently available PDP models. The two 
theoretical camps need each other if either is to 
advance. 
Newell and Simon have outlined an effective 
procedure for studying human behavior and have 
established an accepted and relatively understandable 
formalism for describing human performance. 
Unfortunately, that system does not adequately explain 
how such behaviors can be produced by a highly-parallel 
system such as the human nervous system. PDP models, 
on the other hand, have the potential of modeling a 
great deal of low level mechanism and explaining much 
of the phenomena which is observed in the cognitive 
psychology laboratory. However, pure PDP models of 
higher level processing are difficult to build and test 
because of the huge training overhead. 
Ironically, neural networks may model high-level 
human processes too accurately to be of direct use. 
Just as humans may take years to learn a high level 
skill (chess playing, invention, novel writing, etc) it 
might take a pure neural net just as long to be trained 
in the same high-level knowledge domain. Thus, a 
synthesis of the two approaches seems prudent. 
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First, much of the data collection techniques used 
in the study of human problem solving will remain 
unchanged. The procedures outlined by Newell and 
Simon, and refined by a myriad of other knowledge-
engineers, still seem adequate and useful. Likewise, 
much of the model building will still use production 
systems or other symbolic formalisms to describe 
problem solving behavior. In the short term, these 
systems will most likely be coupled with neural network 
sub-systems in order optimize certain pattern 
recognition operations. A second option for the 
applied world is to develop systems, such as the one 
described in the previous chapter, which can translate 
production systems/symbolic descriptions to neural 
network platforms and back again. In the pure research 
realm, similar hybrid model building will take place, 
but eventually, the theoretical vernacular will 
probably take on a more PDP-like flavor. While I do 
not propose tossing out important concepts such as 
problem space, problem formulation, and heuristics, I 
do think it is time that we began trying to specify in 
PDP-like terms just what it means for someone to be 
using a "means-ends heuristic" and how such a heuristic 
can be implemented on a highly parallel platform. 
Likewise, how does a highly parallel system formulate a 
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problem and plan a strategy for resolving that problem? 
These are all very complex problems and will not be 
resolved in the immediate future. They do, however, 
represent a general goal of cognitive science and the 
attainment of that goal will represent the merging of 
the two information processing paradigms into one. 
As scientists we are obligated to attempt to 
explain our findings at the level of greatest 
specificity available to us. After all, along with the 
ability to produce adequate explanations, precision and 
parsimony are two of the most important criteria by 
which a scientific theory is judged. Again, it is not 
reasonable to discard serial process models, because 
human behavior does have a strong serial component, and 
sequential, symbolic models represent an appropriate 
level of explanation. With the advent of PDP models 
however, we should not be content with the serial level 
of description. While it will take some time for the 
transition to occur, cognitive scientists, who study 
human problem solving, now need to attempt to take 
their models to another level of specificity by 
postulating how their serial models can be implemented 
on a highly parallel system. 
As I hope I have demonstrated in this paper, PDP 
models provide us with a potentially important avenue 
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to new insights and understanding of human problem 
solving, and I believe we should add one more goal to 
the goals outlined by Newell and Simon for the study of 
human problem solving. In order to further the study 
of human problem solving, we should now attempt to 
specify how a highly parallel, PDP-like system can 
produce ordered, goal-oriented, sequences of behavior 
which are consistent with human performance as 
described by serial, symbolic models derived from 
studies of actual human problem solving activity. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure ~. The silhouette of the mechanical object 
used in the experiment. Neither this drawing, or 
the drawing of the nonsense object, are complete 
technical drawings of the objects actually used. 
Both drawings, however, reasonably depict the 
relative visual complexity of the two stimulus 
items. 
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190 
Figure Caption 
Figure 2. Silhouette of the nonsense object which is 
constructed of materials identical to the materials 
used in the mechanical object. 
Figure Caption 
Figure ~- Experimental lab arrangement. 
191 
192 
Figure Caption 
Figure ~. Average number of correct connections made 
during non-zero trials for experts and novices in 
the mechanical and nonsense conditions. 
193 
Figure Caption 
Figure ~. Average number of correct connections made 
when both zero and non-zero trials were included for 
experts and novices in the mechanical and nonsense 
condit1ons. 
Figure Caption 
Figure Q· Average elapsed time necessary to 
construct both objects by experts and novices. 
194 
Figure Caption 
Figure z. Average number of disconnects (errors) 
made by experts and novices in the mechanical and 
nonsense conditions. 
195 
196 
Figure Caption 
Figure 8. Average number of zero trials for expert 
and novices in both conditions. The effects of 
expertise, object type, and the interaction were all 
non-significant (F(1,2) = .35; F(1,2) = 5.89; F(1,2) 
=.51; respectively). 
197 
Figure Caption 
Figure ~- Average number of looks taken by experts 
and novice~ during the construction of both objects. 
198 
Figure Caption 
Figure 10. Newell and Simon's (1972) schematic of an 
Information Processing System (IPS). 
199 
Figure Caption 
Figure 11. Program which describes the behavior of a 
thermostat. 
200 
Figure Caption 
Figure 12. Game state of a tic-tac-toe game in which 
the most successful move for X is the lower center. 
201 
Figure Caption 
Figure 13. The rule-base on the left represents what 
we, as external observers, may propose as a rational 
problem solver given the task demands of a tic-tac-
toe game. The rule base on the right represents the 
player's problem space which is inferred from her 
actual game playing behavior. 
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1. observe-temperature, 
if < 70 degrees go to 2 
if > 72 degrees go to 4 
go to 1; 
2. test if furnace-on 
if true go to 1; 
3. turn-furnace-on 
go to 1; 
4. test if furnace-on 
lf false go to 1; 
5. turn-furnace-off 
go to 1; 
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top 
RATIONAL PROBLEM SOLVERS 
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM 
SPACE 
IF (move=opponent) 
THEN 
stop. 
IF (own=two marks on a row) 
&(blank square on hor~zon) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=two marks on column) 
&(blank square on column) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=two marks on d~ag.) 
&(blank square on d~ag.) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (opp=two marks on a row) 
&(blank square on hor~zon) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (opp=two marks on column) 
&(blank square on column) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (opp=two marks on d~ag.) 
&(blank square on d~ag.) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=fork~ng pattern) 
&(~ntersect~on blank) 
THEN 
play ~ntersect~on. 
IF (opp=fork~ng pattern) 
&(~ntersect~on blank) 
THEN 
play ~ntersect~on. 
IF (center ~s blank) 
THEN 
play center. 
IF (opp=s~de square) 
THEN 
play corner. 
IF (opp=corner) 
THEN 
play oppos~te corner. 
PLAYER'S HYPOTHETICAL 
PROBLEM SPACE INFERRED 
FROM BEHAVIOR 
IF (move=opponent) 
THEN 
stop. 
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IF (opp=two marks on a row) 
&(blank s~~are on hor~zon) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (opp=two marks on column) 
&(blank square on column) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (opp=two marks on d~ag.) 
&(blank square on d~ag.) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=two marks on a row) 
&(blank square on hor~zon) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=two marks on column) 
&(blank square on column) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=two marks on d~ag.) 
&(blank square on d~ag.) 
THEN 
play blank square. 
IF (own=fork~ng pattern) 
&(~ntersect~on blank) 
THEN 
play ~ntersect~on. 
IF (opp=fork~ng pattern) 
&(~ntersect~on blank) 
THEN 
play ~ntersect~on. 
IF (center ~s blank) 
THEN 
play center. 
IF (opp=s~de square) 
THEN 
play corner. 
IF (opp=corner) 
THEN 
play oppos~te corner. 
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